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Abstract 
In 2014, in response to the Ukrainian “Euromaidan”, Russia annexed Cri-
mea and provoked a war in eastern Ukraine. The ensuing conflict still claims 
lives today. For the past five years Germany and its Western partners have 
been trying to resolve the conflict politically, to date without success. The 
Minsk ceasefire agreements of 2014 and 2015 have still not been imple-
mented. 
All the directly involved actors bear responsibility. The separatist “Peo-
ple’s Republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk have established dictatorial quasi-
state structures but remain almost completely dependent on Moscow. Russia 
refuses to acknowledge its role as a party to the conflict. Ukraine has ful-
filled some of its obligations under the Minsk Agreements, but neglected 
others. The situation is exacerbated by negative dynamics on all levels. Kyiv 
and the “People’s Republics” are drifting steadily apart, while millions living 
along the line of contact experience terrible humanitarian suffering. This 
threatens to establish a state of permanent poverty and underdevelopment 
in the regions affected by the conflict. 
The European Union and its member states pursue a division of labour. 
Brussels maintains Union-wide sanctions against Russia and forges ahead 
with implementing the Association Agreement with Ukraine. Germany and 
France conduct peace talks in the so-called Normandy Format. All conflict 
parties must be reminded to avoid escalation risks. Much greater attention 
must be directed to the local level and especially the humanitarian crisis. 
Action at this level is limited in reach but imperative for progress towards 
peace. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
The Donbas Conflict: Opposing Narratives 
and Interests, Difficult Peace Process 
In 2014, in response to the Ukrainian “Euromaidan”, 
Russia annexed Crimea and provoked a war in east-
ern Ukraine. The resulting armed conflict still claims 
lives today. For five years Germany and its Western 
partners have been trying to bring about a political 
solution through negotiations. The basis for their 
efforts is the Minsk Agreements of 2014 and 2015, 
which define the modalities for a permanent cease-
fire and reintegration of the contested territories into 
Ukraine. But the preconditions for implementing 
the Agreements – and thus for peace in eastern 
Ukraine – are steadily deteriorating, as demonstrated 
by the November 2018 escalation in the Kerch Strait. 
All the actors bear responsibility. The separatist 
“People’s Republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk have 
established dictatorial quasi-state structures, which 
in themselves contravene the Minsk Agreements. 
They are politically and economically dependent on 
Russia and practically incapable of acting on their 
own. Ukraine has fulfilled some of its obligations but 
neglected others. The Minsk Agreements are highly 
controversial in Ukraine, where many politicians 
warn that their implementation would consolidate 
Russian influence over Ukraine’s internal affairs and 
foreign policy. There is a strong tendency in Ukraini-
an politics towards isolating the conflict zones. The 
presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled 
for 2019 will further sharpen the internal debate. 
Although Moscow refuses to acknowledge its role as a 
party to the conflict, it controls the People’s Republics 
militarily, politically and economically in order to 
secure influence in Ukraine. While the Kremlin does 
uphold the Minsk Agreements (and suppresses deviat-
ing initiatives in the People’s Republics and within 
Russia), it does little to advance their implementation. 
All the conflict parties regularly violate the Minsk 
security provisions as they seek military gains along 
the line of contact. 
The conflict is characterised by negative dynamics 
on all levels. Kyiv and the “People’s Republics” are 
growing steadily apart. One contributing factor is the 
humanitarian crisis in the conflict region, which the 
Ukrainian leadership has failed to address effectively. 
The growing isolation of the contested territories in-
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creases their dependency on Russia. Ukraine and 
Russia have experienced an extremely rapid process 
of alienation. They uphold mutually exclusive narra-
tives. Kyiv regards the annexation of Crimea and the 
conflict in the Donbas as elements of a Russian war of 
aggression. Russia and the separatists in the contested 
territories insist that the Donbas conflict is a civil war 
with an ethno-political background. These narratives 
allow neither common ground or compromise. Rus-
sia’s relations with the conflict-relevant Western 
actors – the European Union, NATO and the United 
States – have deteriorated drastically, adding more 
obstacles to resolution. The various dimensions of the 
conflict are tightly interlocked, and the impediments 
to peace mutually reinforcing. Under these conditions 
progress will be hard to achieve. 
The European Union and its member states pursue 
a division of labour on the conflict. Berlin and Paris 
play a central role in the so-called Normandy Format, 
which remains the most important political negotiat-
ing track. In 2014 the European Union imposed sanc-
tions on Russia in response to the annexation of 
Crimea and the war in the Donbas. Otherwise it con-
centrates on implementing the EU-Ukraine Associa-
tion Agreement. Berlin and Brussels possess limited 
influence over the aforementioned impediments to 
peace in the Donbas. This applies especially to the 
People’s Republics, with which the European Union 
has no relations, and to Russia, where the relation-
ship has broken down. Ukraine chose association 
with the EU and is more open than Russia to argu-
ments from Berlin and Brussels. But internal Ukrain-
ian politics often complicates the communication. 
Another relevant factor for Germany and Europe is 
that the United States has become a less dependable 
partner in the peace process. Washington does still 
share the central objective of Western policy, namely, 
to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity. But with Trump and Congress pulling in differ-
ent directions, US policy on Minsk and sanctions is 
increasingly subject to volatility. 
I would like to thank my interview partners for 
the trust they showed in me. Without their insights 
this study could never have been written. For valu-
able and inspiring comments and feedback on pre-
vious versions of the manuscript I would like to 
thank Muriel Asseburg, Volker Perthes, the Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia Research Division and in par-
ticular Susan Stewart and Steffen Halling. Finally, my 
gratitude is also owed to Julia Mierau and Anastasia 
Vishnevskaya-Mann for their tireless support in 
collecting and processing the research materials. 
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The contested territories in eastern Ukraine comprise 
parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk administrative 
regions (oblasti).1 Colloquially the region is referred 
to as “Donbas”,2 a portmanteau of “Donetskyi Basein” 
(Donets Basin) referring to the resource-rich catch-
ment area of the Siverskyi Donets River, which spans 
a breadth of about five hundred kilometres between 
the basins of the rivers Dnipro and Don in Ukraine 
and Russia respectively. The Donets Basin as a whole 
covers about 60,000 square kilometres, and accounts 
for 9 percent of the territory of Ukraine.3 The total 
length of Russia’s border with the Donetsk and Lu-
hansk administrative regions is about 920 kilometres, 
about 410 kilometres of which are currently outwith 
the control of the Ukrainian state. The border region 
is flat steppe without natural barriers like rivers or 
 
1 In this publication the separatist entities in eastern 
Ukraine are referred to as the NGCAs (“non–government-
controlled areas”), the People’s Republics, or Donetsk 
People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). 
They are legally an integral part of Ukraine, and their “in-
dependence” is not recognised internationally. The use of 
“scare quotes” and qualifiers such as “so-called” is avoided 
in the interests of readability. The same applies to references 
to political institutions, offices and processes in the People’s 
Republics. 
2 Ukrainian and Russian geographical and proper names 
are transliterated according to the respective rules for each 
language; place-names are given in the language of the 
respective state. 
3 The terms “Donbas” and “Donbas war” are contested in 
Ukraine, on the grounds that the basin’s watershed is not 
identical with the boundaries of the Donetsk and Luhansk 
administrative regions (oblasti). They are used here for 
reasons of readability. See Donbas in Flames: Guide to the Conflict 
Zone (Lviv, 2017), 7–16, https://prometheus.ngo/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/04/Donbas_v_Ogni_ENG_web_1-4.pdf (accessed 
November 2018). 
mountain ranges. In places the border is not even 
consistently demarcated.4 
Historically the region was peripheral and thinly 
populated, only rising to prominence in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century, when its rich 
resources became relevant in the course of industriali-
sation. Mining and associated industries, especially 
during the Soviet era, created its specific settlement 
and population structure. To this day the Donbas 
remains the most heavily urbanised region of Ukraine 
(with 20 percent of the country’s urban settlements) 
and possesses a high proportion of Russian and Rus-
sian-speaking inhabitants with comparably strong ties 
to Russia and the former Soviet Union. Studies on the 
period since Ukrainian independence in 1991, how-
ever, reveal increasing identification with the Donbas 
region, and with the Ukrainian state too.5 Before war 
broke out in spring 2014 the Donbas accounted for 
about 16 percent of the total Ukrainian population – 
but only 8.4 percent of the country’s GDP.6 Increas-
ingly outdated plant and machinery and lack of 
 
4 “Rossijsko-ukrainiskaja granica: Dos’e” [Russian-Ukrain-
ian border: dossier], TASS, 19 June 2014. 
5 According to Wilson the proportion of inhabitants of 
Donetsk who identified with the region rose from 55.7 per-
cent in 1994 to 69.5 percent in 2004. The proportion describ-
ing themselves as Ukrainian was 39.4 percent in 1994 and 
42.7 percent in 2004, as Russian 30.1 percent in 1994 and 
21.1 percent in 2004. Andrew Wilson, “The Donbas in 2014: 
Explaining Civil Conflict Perhaps, But Not Civil War”, Europe-
Asia Studies 68, no. 4 (2016): 631–52 (638). See also the con-
tributions in Olga Onuch, Henry Hale and Gwendolyn Sasse, 
eds., “Studying Identity in Ukraine”, Post-Soviet Affairs 34, 
no. 2/3 (2018). 
6 “The Effect of Company Seizures and Trade Suspension 
in Donbas”, German Advisory Group Ukraine Newsletter, no. 106 
(August 2017). 
The Donbas Conflict: 
Origins, Timeline, 
International Responses 
The Donbas Conflict: Origins, Timeline, International Responses 
SWP Berlin 
The Donbas Conflict 
April 2019 
8 
Kapiteltitel 1 
investment in modernisation caused the region’s 
economy to decline steadily from the 1990s, leading 
to a net loss of working-age inhabitants. 
Timeline: 
Escalation, Internationalisation, Isolation 
The Donbas was the second territorial conflict – fol-
lowing the annexation of Crimea – to affect Ukraine 
after the downfall of President Viktor Yanukovych on 
21 February 2014 in the course of the so-called Euro-
maidan.7 As in Crimea, eastern regions of Ukraine 
saw demonstrations and violent clashes between sup-
porters and opponents of the Euromaidan. These pro-
tests initially affected a large swathe of south-eastern 
 
7 Unless otherwise indicated, the description of the 
sequence of events is based on the annual timelines for 
2013 to 2018 published by Länderanalysen: Forschungsstelle 
Osteuropa et al., Ukraine-Analysen – Chronik, http://www. 
laender-analysen.de/ukraine/chronik.php (accessed January 
2019). 
Ukraine, extending from Odesa through Mariupol 
on the Sea of Azov to Donetsk and Luhansk. Deaths 
occurred, most notoriously in Odesa on 2 May 2014, 
when forty-two opponents of Euromaidan lost their 
lives in a burning building.8 Insurgents occupied gov-
ernment buildings in many cities, and took control 
of important transport hubs and border crossings to 
Russia. While the separatist militias failed to secure 
control of major regional centres like Kharkiv, Odesa 
and Mariupol, they did manage to hold other towns 
west of Donetsk and Luhansk, like Kramatorsk and 
Sloviansk, for several months.9 
 
8 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), Report on the Human Rights Situation 
in Ukraine, 15 May 2014, 15, https://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf 
(accessed January 2019). The investigation of the incident 
has not led to prosecutions of those responsible. 
9 The rebels seized arms from police and security service 
buildings. While appeals were made to return the weapons 
after the towns were recaptured, local observers believe that 
many remain in illegal circulation. Interviews in Kramatorsk 
and Sloviansk, March 2018. 
Map 1 
Ukraine and the Donbas 
Source: www.humanitarianresponse.info 
 Timeline: Escalation, Internationalisation, Isolation 
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The separatists declared the People’s Republics of 
Donetsk and Luhansk in April 2014, and held refer-
endums in both areas on 11 May. On account of the 
irregular circumstances the votes were not recognised 
internationally. According to the organisers more 
than 90 percent of participants voted to establish the 
People’s Republics.10 
Kyiv was completely overwhelmed in the initial 
months of the war, and the rebels enjoyed a mili-
tary advantage. The Ukrainian interim government 
launched an “anti-terrorism operation” against the 
separatists in April, but initially suffered heavy losses. 
During this period increasing numbers of fighters and 
heavy weapons found their way across the Russian-
Ukrainian border into the warzone. Over time, how-
ever, Ukraine succeeded in regrouping militarily and 
recaptured territory from the separatists. On 17 July 
2014 a Malaysian passenger jet (flight MH17) was shot 
down by a Russian Buk anti-aircraft missile, killing 
all 298 persons on board. The European Union, the 
United States and NATO regarded this as proof of 
Russian involvement in the war and stepped up their 
sanctions.11 In August 2014, with the separatists fac-
ing military defeat despite Russian support, Russian 
forces intervened actively in the fighting and inflicted 
a heavy defeat on the Ukrainians at Ilovaisk.12 Inter-
national mediation in the aftermath resulted in the 
first ceasefire agreement, the Minsk Protocol, signed 
on 5 September in the Belarusian capital (see p. 12). 
After a renewed escalation at the beginning of 2015, a 
package of thirteen measures to implement the Minsk 
Protocol was agreed on 12 February 2015.13 
 
10 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 
15 June 2014, 29, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15June2014.pdf (accessed 
January 2019). Observers report extremely low turnout 
and voter coercion. 
11 For investigations, findings and responses, see Joint In-
vestigation Team, https://www.om.nl/mh17-ezine-juni2016/e-
zine-en.html (accessed December 2018). 
12 At this point the city of Donetsk was almost completely 
encircled by Ukrainian forces. The loss of Ilovaisk would 
have cut the secessionists’ last supply line from the Russian 
border to Donetsk. International Crisis Group (ICG), Eastern 
Ukraine: A Dangerous Winter, Europe Report no. 235 (Brussels, 
December 2014), 2. 
13 The Minsk Package of Measures was supposed to end the 
fighting and initiate a peace process. But before it came into 
effect on 15 February 2015 heavy fighting resumed over the 
vital railway junction at Debaltseve, continuing until the 
Ukrainian forces abandoned the town. 
2014 and 2015 saw the worst conflict-related 
losses, with the United Nations reporting 9,100 deaths 
and 20,700 injured by November 2015.14 Since 2016 
the annual death toll has been closer to 500 to 600. 
Despite regular extensions of the ceasefire, the situa-
tion along the line of contact remains unstable as 
both sides attempt to gain ground and shift the line 
in their favour. In contrast, for example, to the con-
flicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia or South Ossetia, one 
cannot at this stage speak of a stable military status 
quo.15 
That point is illustrated by the escalation in the 
Kerch Strait. On 25 November 2018 Russian coast 
guard patrol ships fired on two Ukrainian artillery 
boats and a tug that had attempted to pass into the 
Sea of Azov en route from Odesa to Mariupol. A num-
ber of Ukrainian sailors were injured, some seriously. 
The crews were detained and taken to Lefortovo 
Prison in Moscow. In response Ukrainian President 
 
14 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 
16 August 2015 – 15 November 2015, 2, https://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Countries/UA/12thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf 
(accessed January 2019). Today the UN speaks of about 
10,500 dead and almost 24,000 wounded, about 30 percent 
of them civilians. But precise figures are hard to come by. 
While the Ukrainian defence ministry regularly publishes 
data, no verifiable figures are forthcoming from the rebels 
or Russia. In 2016 the International Crisis Group criticised 
all sides for playing down the casualty figures. ICG, Ukraine: 
The Line, Europe/Central Asia Briefing 81 (18 July 2016), 2ff. 
In April 2017 the Union of the Committees of Soldiers’ 
Mothers of Russia estimated that 1,500 Russian soldiers and 
other fighters had been killed. “About 1,500 Russian Soldiers 
Killed in Donbas since Spring 2014: Russian NGO”, UNIAN, 
28 April 2017. The figures for civilian victims are based on 
Ukrainian information, and estimates by international orga-
nisations for areas they were able to access. The actual num-
bers are probably higher. Data on casualties: “Global Conflict 
Tracker: Conflict in Ukraine”, Council on Foreign Relations 
website, 6 December 2018, https://www.cfr.org/interactives/ 
global-conflict-tracker?marker=26#!/conflict/conflict-in-
ukraine (accessed December 2018). 
15 According to SMM there were 401,336 ceasefire viola-
tions in 2016 and 320,130 in 2017. Weapons whose presence 
violated the Minsk Agreements were sighted in the conflict 
zone 3,099 times in 2016 and 4,065 in 2017. Observers were 
obstructed in exercising their mandate in 1,950 cases in 
2016, and considerably more often – 2,422 times – in 2017. 
OSCE, 2016 OSCE SMM Activities in Figures, 6 February 2017, 
http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/298131 (accessed Novem-
ber 2018); OSCE, 2017 OSCE SMM Activities in Figures, 26 Feb-
ruary 2018, http://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-
to-ukraine/368246 (accessed November 2018). 
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Petro Poroshenko imposed martial law for thirty 
days in the regions bordering Russia and Crimea and 
demanded the immediate release of the imprisoned 
crews. From the Ukrainian perspective the incident 
represented a new level of aggression, seeking to 
place the Sea of Azov under Russian control – in-
cluding if possible its northern shores to connect the 
Donbas with Crimea. Russia for its part claimed that 
the Ukrainian vessels had violated its “territorial 
waters”. 
2017: Kyiv imposes economic 
embargo on areas outside its control. 
The Kerch escalation was foreseeable, and in a 
sense represents a consequence of the annexation of 
Crimea. The situation at the Strait had already esca-
lated during the construction of the Kerch Strait 
Bridge (2016–2018), which connects Crimea to the 
Russian mainland. The bridge seriously restricts 
access to the Sea of Azov, and thus to the Ukrainian 
orts of Mariupol and Berdyansk; as such Ukraine has 
already suffered considerable economic losses. The 
Russian navy has continuously expanded its presence 
in the Strait since 2017, conducting increasingly in-
vasive inspections on vessels passing through.16 In 
2014/2015 Donbas separatists and Russian national-
ists pressed for the capture of Mariupol – which is 
very close to the current line of contact – in order 
to create a land bridge to Crimea. Now the Kerch 
Strait Bridge has shifted the balance of forces in the 
Sea of Azov, creating a potentially explosive connec-
tion between annexed Crimea and the conflict zones 
in the Donbas. 
Kyiv’s imposition of an economic embargo on the 
areas outside its control (non–government-controlled 
areas, NGCAs) in spring 2017 represented an impor-
tant turning point. The initiative came from right-
 
16 See Susan Stewart, Asowsches Meer: Neues Eskalationspoten-
zial zwischen Russland und der Ukraine, SWP Kurz gesagt (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 22 August 2018). 
Map 2 
The conflict region 
Source: www.humanitarianresponse.info 
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wing veterans and activists in Ukraine, who protested 
against the “blood trade” with the NGCAs that, they 
argued, kept the separatist regimes afloat. The Ukrain-
ian government initially argued against isolating the 
breakaway areas on account of the economic and 
humanitarian consequences, but ultimately gave in 
to the pressure. On 15 March 2017 it officially banned 
economic exchange with the NGCAs. At the begin-
ning of that month the rulers in Donetsk and Lu-
hansk had placed forty businesses hitherto registered 
in the government-controlled areas (GCAs) under 
“temporary external administration”, de facto expro-
priating them.17 These moves forced both sides to 
adjust to new realities. The economic repercussions 
for Ukraine were less severe than initially feared.18 
But industrial production in the NGCAs collapsed 
with grave economic consequences. Smuggling and 
black marketeering aside, the GCAs and NGCAs are 
today completely isolated from one another. 
Peace Negotiations and the 
Minsk Agreements 
International efforts to prevent further escalation 
began in spring 2014. In March the Permanent Coun-
cil of the OSCE agreed to deploy a Special Monitoring 
Mission (SMM) to Ukraine. The SMM is an unarmed 
civilian mission whose mandate is to document 
political developments and the human rights situa-
tion in Ukraine as a whole.19 Since September 2014 
the SMM has also been monitoring the (non-)obser-
vance of the Donbas ceasefire.20 The Mission’s work 
 
17 “External administration” involved the separatists 
taking over the management of enterprises without a formal 
change of ownership. Moscow apparently dissuaded them 
from speaking of “nationalisation” in order to avoid violat-
ing the spirit of the Minsk Agreements. 
18 “The Effect of Company Seizures and Trade Suspension 
in Donbas” (see note 6). Business representatives pointed out 
that the value of plant and equipment fell rapidly after the 
expropriations on account of reduced utilisation and lack 
of investment and maintenance. Consequently, they said, it 
was becoming increasingly unlikely that operations would 
resume if the embargo was lifted. Interviews in Kyiv and 
Kramatorsk, March 2018. 
19 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine website, 
https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine 
(accessed November 2018). 
20 The work of the SMM is complemented by the Joint 
Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC). This contact 
concentrates strongly on the eastern regions.21 From 
an initial strength of about one hundred, it has grown 
to more than seven hundred observers from more than 
forty-four OSCE states and altogether twelve hundred 
staff.22 
The Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), coordinated by 
the OSCE and comprising representatives of Ukraine, 
Russia and the separatists, convened in June 2014, 
and has been holding fortnightly meetings in Minsk 
since September 2014. In May 2015 four working 
groups were established to structure the talks: secu-
rity, political, economic, humanitarian. In 2014/2015 
the Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini coordinated the 
work of the TCG as Special Representative of the 
OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. She was succeeded in 
summer 2015 by the Austrian diplomat Martin 
Sajdik. 
The so-called Normandy Format arose out of a June 
2014 meeting of the heads of state and government 
of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany marking the 
seventieth anniversary of the Allied D-Day landings. 
The talks continued at various levels (foreign minis-
ters, state secretaries, advisors) and provided the 
political framework for the talks in Minsk in Sep-
tember 2014 and February 2015. An informal Russian-
American track emerged in May 2015, bringing to-
gether US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland 
and Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Grigory Karasin, the latter succeeded by presidential 
 
group composed of Ukrainian and Russian officers has been 
responsible for the Mission’s security since autumn 2014. 
Russia withdrew from the JCCC in December 2017 claiming 
that its officers had been poorly treated. While observers 
conceded that there was some truth to the Russian com-
plaints, they interpreted Moscow’s decision as another at-
tempt to force the Ukrainians into direct contact with those 
in power in Donetsk and Luhansk. Interviews with partici-
pants in the talks, 2017 and 2018. 
21 Claus Neukirch, “Die Sonderbeobachtermission in der 
Ukraine: Operative Herausforderungen und neue Horizonte”, 
in OSZE-Jahrbuch 2014, ed. Institut für Friedensforschung und 
Sicherheitspolitik (IFSH) (Baden-Baden, 2015), 205–221 
(206). The OSCE also has observers not affiliated to the SMM 
at two Russian control posts on the Russian-Ukrainian 
border (ibid., 214). 
22 See OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 
“Status Report as of 1 October 2018”, October 2018, https:// 
www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/ 
398813?download=true (accessed November 2018). 
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advisor Vladislav Surkov.23 In July 2017 US diplomat 
Kurt Volker took over the talks for the Trump Ad-
ministration. 
The Minsk Agreements represent the most important 
outcome of the international peace efforts to date. 
They comprise two documents negotiated in Septem-
ber 2014 and February 2015 in Minsk, in the TCG 
framework and with the support of the Normandy 
Format. The Protocol of 5 September 2014 provided 
for an immediate ceasefire, monitored by the OSCE; 
decentralisation in Ukraine, including a special status 
law for the contested areas; a buffer zone along the 
Ukrainian-Russian border, monitored by the OSCE; 
the release of all hostages and illegally detained per-
sons; a Ukrainian amnesty law; continuation of a 
national dialogue; measures to improve the humani-
tarian situation in the Donbas; local elections in the 
contested areas, under Ukrainian control and inter-
national observation; the withdrawal of illegal armed 
units from Ukrainian territory; a reconstruction pro-
gramme for the Donbas; and guarantees of personal 
security for participants in the talks.24 The second 
Minsk document of 12 February 2015 (frequently also 
known as Minsk II) listed concrete measures and steps 
designed to implement the agreements by the end of 
2015.25 
By signing the Minsk Agreements the separatists 
in effect agreed to disband their armed units and dis-
solve their emerging quasi-state structures, and ulti-
mately to permit the gradual reintegration of the 
People’s Republics into the Ukrainian state. In addi-
 
23 Vladimir Socor, “Surkov-Nuland Talks on Ukraine: A 
Nontransparent Channel”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, no. 103 
(27 May 2016). 
24 Protokol po itogam konsulacij Trechstoronnoj kontaktnoj grupy 
otnositel’no sovmestnych shagov, napravlennych na implementaciju 
Mirnogo plana Prezidenta Ukrainy P. Poroshenko i itiniativ Preziden-
ta Rossii V. Putina [Protocol on the results of the consultations 
of the Trilateral Contact Group concerning joint steps to im-
plement the Peace Plan of Ukrainian President P. Poroshenko 
and the initiative of Russian President V. Putin], 5 February 
2014, http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true 
(accessed Dezember 2018). A memorandum concretising 
certain points was signed on 19 September 2014. 
25 The package of measures of 15 February was accom-
panied by a political declaration by the Normandy Group. 
Both texts can be found in United Nations, Unanimously 
Adopting Resolution 2202 (2015), Security Council Calls on Parties to 
Implement Accords Aimed at Peaceful Settlement in Eastern Ukraine, 
17 February 2015, http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11785. 
doc.htm (accessed December 2018). 
tion to observing a ceasefire, Kyiv agreed to disband 
Ukrainian militias, to pass an amnesty law, a special 
status law and a constitutional amendment; to resume 
social benefit and pension payments to recipients in 
the contested areas; and to draw up a strategy for eco-
nomic reconstruction. 
Parties unable to agree sequencing of 
political and military measures. 
The Minsk Agreements do not treat Russia as a 
party to the conflict, and thus place no obligations on 
Moscow. Even Point 10 of the Protocol, providing for 
withdrawal of all “illegal armed groups and military 
equipment as well as fighters and mercenaries”, does 
not refer directly to Russian troops and volunteers. 
In view of Russia’s ongoing political and military sup-
port for the separatists this creates an imbalance that 
continues to subvert implementation of the Agree-
ments. 
Despite intense diplomatic efforts the Minsk 
Package of Measures was not implemented by the end 
of 2015 as planned, because the parties were unable 
to agree on the sequencing of political and military 
measures. The main points of contention were the 
modalities for holding elections, the status of the con-
tested areas within the Ukrainian state and the timing 
for returning full control of the Russian border to 
Kyiv. Ukraine argued that it could not fulfil the politi-
cal conditions until the ceasefire was permanent, 
while Russia and the separatists called for the politi-
cal and security provisions to be implemented in 
parallel. In autumn 2016 then German Foreign Minis-
ter and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier circulated a proposal designed to resolve 
these contradictions. The “Steinmeier formula” de-
scribes in detail a complex sequencing of troop with-
drawal and elections in the contested territories, 
leading to restoration of Ukrainian control. At the 
same time the TCG reached an agreement on dis-
engagement of forces.26 The meeting of the heads of 
 
26 The disengagement agreement provided for all forces 
to pull back one kilometre from the line of contact and 
completely withdraw all heavy weaponry, initially in three 
defined areas (Petrivske and Solote in the Donetsk region, 
Stanytsia Luhanska in the Luhansk region). The agreement 
provided for implementation within one month, followed 
by the establishment of another four disengagement areas 
by the end of October 2016. The agreement was implement-
ed as scheduled at Solote and Petrivske, but failed at Stany-
tsia Luhanska after Ukraine refused to withdraw its forces 
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state and government in the Normandy Format on 
19 October 2016 in Berlin agreed to prepare a road-
map for implementing the Minsk Package of Meas-
ures. 
Today, more than two years later, the measures 
laid out in the “Steinmeier formula” remain unim-
plemented, nor have the parties agreed on a road-
map. The international peace efforts received their 
last boost to date in early September 2017 when 
Vladimir Putin proposed a UN mission to protect the 
SMM along the line of contact. Petro Poroshenko 
welcomed Moscow’s change of position. The Ukrain-
ian leadership had already proposed deploying a UN 
peacekeeping force in 2015, but with access to the 
entire contested area and to the Russian-Ukrainian 
border. At the OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan 
in December 2018, following the Kerch escalation, 
Martin Sajdik, Special Representative of the OSCE 
Chair-in-Office, proposed a joint OSCE/UN mission.27 
His discussion paper has to date been neither ac-
cepted nor rejected by the parties. Kyiv and Moscow 
are still too far apart for a compromise to be possi-
ble.28 
The TCG concentrates on the concrete implemen-
tation of the Minsk Agreements, the situation in the 
conflict region and the resolution of immediate prob-
lems there. At least in the first two years the eco-
nomic and humanitarian working groups were able 
to achieve limited progress. The political and security 
working groups are deadlocked, largely because they 
address the most contentious questions of status and 
 
(which have remained in place to this day). See OSCE, Frame-
work Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group Relating to Disengage-
ment of Forces and Hardware, 21 September 2016, http://www. 
osce.org/cio/266266 (accessed November 2018). 
27 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “OSCE Ministerial Council in 
Milan: Expressing Differences Rather than Solving Them”, 
Security and Human Rights Monitor, 11 December 2018, https:// 
www.shrmonitor.org/osce-ministerial-council-in-milan-
expressing-differences-rather-than-resolving-them/ (accessed 
January 2019). On the content of the paper see “Sonder-
gesandter Sajdik: Haben neuen Plan zur Lösung der Ukraine-
Krise”, Kleine Zeitung, 24 January 2019; Zver’ u Vorot [Beast at 
the gates], 5 February 2019, http://project.liga.net/projects/ 
beast_at_the_gates/ (accessed February 2019). 
28 Putin’s initiative did, however, generate intense inter-
national discussion among state and non-state actors, which 
led to concrete proposals for a possible UN peacekeeping 
mission. See ICG, Can Peacekeepers Break the Deadlock in Ukraine? 
(Brussels, December 2017); Richard Gowan, Can the United 
Nations Unite Ukraine? (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 
February 2018). 
security. Part of the explanation also lies in the con-
stellation of the two formats. Whereas the separatists 
are represented in the TCG, they have no access to 
the Normandy Format. In line with Ukrainian and 
Russian wishes, political questions are negotiated in 
the Normandy Format without participation by the 
separatists. But Moscow insists on having the out-
comes confirmed by the TCG, and thus also by the 
separatists. This strategy allows the Kremlin to guard 
its decision-making autonomy in the spheres of 
politics and security, while forcing the other partici-
pants – including Ukraine – to recognise the sepa-
ratists as negotiating partners.29 
 
29 Interviews with participants in the talks, 2017 and 2018. 
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The People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk 
are very new entities, existing under conditions of 
ongoing armed conflict.30 This sets them apart from 
the breakaway entities in Moldova and the South 
Caucasus, which have established partially function-
ing de facto state structures since the mid-1990s. 
While not internationally recognised, the latter do 
possess a degree of legitimacy among their own 
populations,31 from which the two Donbas People’s 
Republics are far removed. Their emergence hinged 
much more strongly on deliberate Russian interven-
tion than did the older de facto states. The Donbas 
People’s Republics are not only completely economi-
cally dependent on Russia but also under Moscow’s 
direct political control.32 At this juncture it is an open 
 
30 Access to the People’s Republics has been drastically 
curtailed since 2016. During a research trip to Kyiv and the 
Donbas in March 2018, the author attempted to visit Do-
netsk to conduct interviews but was refused permission to 
enter. The present analysis of the situation in the contested 
territories is therefore based on media reports, secondary 
literature and interviews with individuals who travel there 
regularly. 
31 Thomas de Waal, Uncertain Ground: Engaging with Europe’s 
De Facto States and Breakaway Territories (Brussels: Carnegie 
Europe, November 2018). See also the contributions in James 
Ker-Lindsay and Eiki Berg, eds., “Engagement without Recog-
nition: The Politics of International Interaction with De Facto 
States”, Ethnopolitics 17, no. 4 (2018): 335–442. 
32 Given this lack of independence, conflict-relevant nar-
ratives are not discussed (unlike in the following chapters 
on Ukraine and Russia). The separatist forces in Donetsk and 
Luhansk operate within a discursive framework defined by 
Moscow. 
question whether they could in the longer term be-
come more similar to the other de facto states, which 
were themselves initially, to different degrees, char-
acterised by irregular forces, decentralised rule and 
excessive violence.33 
The origins of the anti-Maidan protests in eastern 
Ukraine remain a matter of great controversy. Some 
argue that they were instigated by Moscow, and 
would never have occurred without Russian manipu-
lation.34 Others attribute them to an autochthonous 
movement that emerged without Russian prompting, 
but later required Russian protection.35 Another 
school of thought again sees Russian interference at 
work but concedes limited autonomy to local actors.36 
 
33 Nina Caspersen, Unrecognized States (Cambridge, 2012), 76f. 
34 See for example, Nikolay Mitrochin, “Infiltration, In-
struktion, Invasion: Russlands Krieg in der Ukraine”, Ost-
europa 64, no. 8 (2014): 3–16. 
35 This largely corresponds to the official Russian inter-
pretation. 
36 See Steffen Halling and Susan Stewart, Ukraine in Crisis: 
Challenges of Developing a New Political Culture, SWP Comment 
185/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 
2014); Ulrich Schneckener, “Hybrider Krieg in Zeiten der 
Geopolitik? Zur Deutung und Charakterisierung des Donbas-
Konflikts”, Politische Vierteljahrsschrift 57, no. 1 (2016): 586–
613. Bruno de Cordier speaks of a genuine identity of resist-
ance in the Donbas, in “Der Vendée-Krieg in der Ukraine? 
Ein Blick auf die Widerstandsidentität des Aufstands im 
Donbas”, Ukraine-Analysen, no. 175 (9 November 2016): 2–6. 
Andrew Wilson sees extensive Russian manipulation but 
concedes that Kyiv’s neglect and the exploitative policies of 
the eastern Ukrainian oligarchs gave parts of the population 
genuine reason to take to the streets in spring 2014. Wilson, 
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The question of the origins, motivation and objectives 
of the insurgency is at the same time the question 
of who was to blame for the war. The answer to that 
question determines which paths to conflict resolu-
tion are plausible. The following discussion is based 
on the assessment that sufficient political frustration 
was present in the Donbas to trigger protests against 
Kyiv in the heady atmosphere of spring 2014. But 
ethnically motivated separatism could not be iden-
tified either before or after the outbreak of fighting.37 
Ample evidence exists for early intervention by 
Russian actors. As well as local volunteers and mem-
bers of local elites,38 the armed insurgents included 
increasing numbers of Russian nationals and persons 
with long residence in Russia. Many of them had 
served in the Soviet and/or Russian armed forces and 
intelligence services, others had close ties to extreme 
nationalist circles in Russia. Cossack units also par-
ticipated actively in the fighting.39 
Violent Power Struggles 
The emergence of the People’s Republics has been 
characterised by numerous violent power struggles. 
From summer 2014 the most radical advocates of 
wider military expansion were forced into exile in 
Russia, detained or assassinated. These included Pavel 
Gubarev and Igor Girkin (Strelkov) in the Donetsk 
 
“The Donbas in 2014” (see note 5). A similar assessment is 
shared by Konstantin Skorkin, in A Counter-Elite Takes Power – 
The New Leaders of the Donbas (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Cen-
ter, 16 February 2018), http://carnegie.ru/commentary/75549 
(accessed November 2018). 
37 See the survey conducted by the Ukrainian newspaper 
Zerkalo Nedeli in April 2014: “Jugo-Vostok: vet’ dreva nashego” 
[The south-east is our shared ancestral home], Zerkalo Nedeli, 
18 April 2014; Gwendolyn Sasse, The Donbas – Two Parts, or 
Still One? ZOiS Report 2/2017 (Berlin: Zentrum für Osteuropa- 
und internationale Studien [ZOiS], May 2017). 
38 Eastern Ukrainian oligarchs, above all Rinat Akhmetov, 
exacerbated tensions by oscillating between supporting Kiyv 
and the rebels. Maksim Vichrov and Maksim Butchenko, 
Fenomen narodnych respublik Donbassa [The phenomenon of the 
People’s Republics in Donbas], (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow 
Centre, 12 April 2016), https://carnegie.ru/2016/04/12/ru-pub-
63295 (accessed November 2018). Interviews with eye-wit-
nesses, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 2018. 
39 For a detailed treatment see Nikolay Mitrochin, “Trans-
nationale Provokation: Russische Nationalisten und Geheim-
dienstler in der Ukraine”, Osteuropa 64, no. 5/6 (2014): 157–
74 (158ff.). 
People’s Republic (DPR) and the Cossack leader Niko-
layi Kosyzin in the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). 
Alexander Zakharchenko (born 1975), a businessman 
from Kharkiv and commander of the Oplot Brigade, 
assumed the leadership of the Donetsk People’s Re-
public in August 2014.40 Igor Plotnitsky (born 1964), 
a former Red Army soldier who had held positions 
in various Ukrainian enterprises, took charge in Lu-
hansk.41 The displacement of the first more radical 
generation of separatists eliminated resistance to the 
Minsk Agreements of September 2014 at a juncture 
where Russia, facing growing international pressure, 
was interested in containing the conflict. The initial, 
intense phase of “purges” lasted until summer 2015 
in the DPR, and into 2016 in the LPR,42 with power 
struggles and assassinations continuing in both.43 In 
November 2017 Igor Plotnitsky fled to Russia after an 
internal power struggle.44 Minister of State Security 
Leonid Pasechnik (born 1970) succeeded him as acting 
leader of the LPR. Less than a year later, on 30 August 
2018, Alexander Zakharchenko was killed by a bomb 
in Donetsk and replaced by Denis Pushilin (born 
1981). Pasetshnik and Pushilin were both confirmed 
in office in elections held on 11 November 2018.45 
These most recent events in both entities, especially 
the Zakharchenko assassination, gave rise to exten-
sive speculation. As leader of the politically and eco-
nomically weightier of the two People’s Republics, 
Zakharchenko had enjoyed considerably more atten-
 
40 “Kto est’ kto na rukovodjashzhich dolzhnostjach DNR, 
LNR i Novorosii” [Who’s who in leading positions in DPR, 
LPR and Novorossiya?], RIA Novosti, 5 September 2014. 
41 “Biografia Igorja Plotnitskogo” [Biography of Igor 
Plotnitsky], RIA Novosti, 20 August 2014. 
42 Nikolay Mitrochin, “Diktaturtransfer im Donbas: Gewalt 
und ‘Staatsbildung’ in Russlands ‘Volksrepubliken’”, Ost-
europa 67 no. 3/4 (2017): 41–66. 
43 “Zachar, ‘Motorola’, ‘Givi’, ‘Betmen’ i drugie: Kak i za 
chto kombaty gibridnoj vojny na vostoke Ukrainy pogibali 
v tylu” [Zachar, Morotola, Givi, Betmen and others: How 
and why the fighters in the hybrid war in Ukraine died in 
the hinterland], Novaya Gazeta, 31 August 2018. 
44 Nikolaus von Twickel, “Developments in ‘DNR’ and 
‘LNR’: 12 October – 28 November 2017”, Civic Monitoring 
Newsletter 25, http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-
in-dnr-and-lnr-23-august-20-october-2017-newsletter-24/ 
(accessed November 2018). 
45 Both were virtually unchallenged, as other well-known 
separatists were prevented from standing. “Ukraine plevat’, 
da nam i tozhe” [Ukraine doesn’t care, neither do we], Novaya 
Gazeta, 12 November 2018. 
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tion than his counterpart Plotnitsky,46 which he regu-
larly exploited to publicly criticise the Minsk Agree-
ments and air controversial proposals. For example in 
July 2017 – to the surprise of both the Kremlin and 
the LPR leadership – he announced the unification 
of the two People’s Republics to create “Malorossiya” 
(Little Russia).47 Moscow accused the Ukrainian lead-
ership and intelligence services of his murder, while 
Kyiv insisted that Russia was behind the assassina-
tion. Other possible explanations for the crime in-
cluded local rivalries or a “war of the curators” in 
Moscow.48 Leonid Pasechnik is a former member of 
the Ukrainian security agency SBU. Until November 
2017 he was defence minister in the LPR and one of 
Plotnitsky’s main rivals.49 Denis Pushilin is the only 
eastern Ukrainian separatist whose political career 
began before 2014.50 He served briefly as head of state 
of the DPR in 2014 and as Chairman of the People’s 
Soviet until August 2018. In the latter capacity he 
represented the entity in the Trilateral Contact Group. 
He did not participate actively in the fighting and is 
regarded as a supporter of the Minsk Agreements. 
Establishment of Quasi-state Institutions 
Although both People’s Republics adopted “democratic 
constitutions” in May 2014, the political and social 
realities are very different.51 In fact dictatorial systems 
have been created.52 Both People’s Republics estab-
lished a government, other constitutional organs, 
 
46 Eye-witnesses report a full-blown cult of personality sur-
rounding Zakharchenko in the DPR. 
47 Daniil Sotnikov, “Zacharchenko sam naznachaet sebja 
glavoj Malorossii” [Zacharchenko dclares himself leader of 
Malorossiya], TVRain, 18 July 2017. 
48 Nikolaus von Twickel, “Zum Hintergrund des Attentats 
auf Alexander Sachartschenko”, in: Ukraine Verstehen, 7 Sep-
tember 2018, https://ukraineverstehen.de/sachartschenkos-
attentat/ (accessed November 2018). 
49 “Kto takoj Pasechnik i kakoj konflikt byl u nego s Plot-
nitskim“ [Who Pasechnik is and his conflicts with Plotnit-
sky], DNR24, 16 November 2018. 
50 In 2013 he stood unsuccessfully for a seat in the Ver-
chovna Rada. 
51 Konstitutsija Donetskoj Narodnoj Respubliki, https://nslnr.su/ 
zakonodatelstvo/konstitutsiya/ [Constitution of the Donetzk 
People’s Republic] (accessed November 2018); Konstitutsija 
Luganskoj Respubliki [Constitution of the Lugansk People’s 
Republic], https://dnrsovet.su/konstitutsiya/ (accessed No-
vember 2018). 
52 Mitrochin, “Diktaturtransfer im Donbas” (see note 42), 41. 
armed forces, security forces, intelligence services and 
courts in 2014,53 and held their first presidential and 
parliamentary elections on 2 November that year – 
in violation of the Minsk Agreements. Like the May 
2014 independence referendums, neither the Novem-
ber 2014 nor the November 2018 elections satisfied 
international standards; they proceeded without in-
ternational observers and excluded IDPs living else-
where.54 
The political institutions in the People’s Republics 
possess staff and internet presences, and run informa-
tion campaigns of varying reach. Political and eco-
nomic conflicts are generally not conducted via these 
institutions, however, but informally and frequently 
violently. The two parliaments are dominated by 
groups supporting the respective rulers. There is no 
functioning– let alone independent – judiciary,55 
the media cannot operate freely and critical journal-
ists and bloggers are subject to repression. There is 
no dependable survey data on the political opinions 
of the respective populations, but eye-witnesses 
report apathy and withdrawal. The military and secu-
rity forces are home to many former fighters, it is re-
ported, but also to individuals seeking income and 
opportunities in an otherwise deteriorating economic 
situation. They are reported to exercise brutal and 
arbitrary violence against political adversaries and the 
wider population.56 There are numerous reports of 
prisoners being held without legal process, sometimes 
for years, and tortured in basement cells.57 
 
53 See the official websites of DNR, https://dnr-online.ru/ 
(accessed November 2018), and LNR, https://glava-lnr.info/ 
(accessed November 2018). 
54 Anton Shechovtsov, “Foreign Observation of the Illegit-
imate ‘General Elections’ in the Donetsk People’s Republic 
and the Lugansk People’s Republic in November 2018”, Euro-
pean Platform for Democratic Elections website, 13 Novem-
ber 2018. 
55 OSCE, Access to Justice and the Conflict in Ukraine, OSCE 
SMM Thematic Report (December 2015), https://www.osce. 
org/ukraine-smm/212311?download=true (accessed January 
2019). 
56 Interviews in Kyiv, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 
2018. 
57 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 
You Don’t Exist: Arbitrary Detentions, Enforced Disappearances, 
and Torture in Eastern Ukraine (London, 2016), https://www. 
amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR5044552016ENGLISH.
PDF (accessed January 2019). Interviews with victims, Kyiv, 
March 2018. 
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Economic Decline and Dependency 
on Russia 
The war years of 2014 and 2015 caused a dramatic 
economic collapse on both sides of the line of contact. 
Much of the industrial equipment and infrastructure 
in the areas of fighting was damaged, looted or de-
stroyed. Supply chains were broken, trade ceased. The 
banking system collapsed and the region was cut off 
from the international financial transaction system. 
It is estimated that the region’s economy shrank by 
about two-thirds in 2014.58 Payments of pensions and 
other social benefits ceased from the end of the year, 
further exacerbating socio-economic hardship. Only 
the surviving Ukrainian enterprises continued to 
ensure that wages were paid more or less regularly, 
and also provided humanitarian aid. 
In the course of 2015 Russia began paying pen-
sions, benefits and wages in both entities. While this 
began hesitantly, not least on account of the eco-
nomic crisis in Russia, it ultimately led to a consoli-
dation of the new power structures – and to their 
absolute economic dependency on Russia. In 2016 the 
International Crisis Group estimated that Russian 
financial aid to the contested parts of eastern Ukraine 
amounted to about $1 billion annually, and put the 
Russian share of the budgets of the two territories at 
70–90 percent.59 
Attempts by the People’s Republics to persuade 
businesses operating in their territory to pay taxes 
met with very modest success.60 Most firms remained 
registered on the Ukrainian-controlled side and ini-
tially continued to operate across the line of contact.61 
 
58 Anders Aslund, “Kremlin Aggression in Ukraine: 
The Price Tag”, Atlantic Council website, March 2018, 7. 
Ukraine’s GDP shrank by 6.5 percent in 2014. The German 
Advisory Group on Ukraine attributed about half the decline 
to the fighting in Donbas. “Deepening of the Recession Due 
to the Situation in Eastern Ukraine”, German Advisory Group 
Newsletter, no. 72 (October 2014). 
59 ICG, Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine, Europe 
and Central Asia Briefing 79 (Brussels and Kyiv, 5 February 
2016), 5ff. 
60 “Rassledovanie RBK: Na ch'i den’gi zhivet Donbass“ 
[RBK investigation: Whose money keeps Donbas alive], RBK, 
15 June 2015; “Kak vyzhivaet biznes v Donbasse” [How busi-
nesses survive in Donbas], Meduza, 18 February 2015. 
61 Rinat Akhmetov’s businesses reported employing up to 
120,000 people before they were expropriated, and supply-
ing humanitarian aid to more. Interviews in Kyiv, March 
2018. See Natalia Mirimanova, Business Opportunities Lost … 
Kyiv tolerated trade with the People’s Republics:62 
Although Ukraine was increasingly substituting 
anthracite from the NGCA with imports from South 
Africa, it initially still used supplies from the break-
away entities for electricity generation. The Ukrain-
ian-controlled areas continued to supply the (re-
maining) steel industry in the NGCAs with iron ore.63 
The NGCAs also continued to receive electricity from 
the GCAs. Other products were also traded, alongside 
significant smuggling and corruption. This arrange-
ment ended abruptly in March 2017, when Kyiv im-
posed an economic embargo on the NGCAs. Industrial 
production in the People’s Republics collapsed, numer-
ous workers were made redundant, and (where they 
were still paid at all) wages were cut by up to 50 per-
cent.64 Efforts to find new markets in Russia had at 
best partial success. 
 
and Found: Small and Medium Sized Enterprises from Donbass 
Responding to the Conflict (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue, November 2016); Natalia Mirimanova, Economic 
Connectivity across the Line of Contact in the Donbas, Ukraine: An 
Under-utilised Resource for Conflict Resolution (Geneva: Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue, September 2017). 
62 Transparency International and NAKO, Crossing the Line: 
How the Illegal Trade with Occupied Donbas Undermines Defence 
Integrity (2017), https://nako.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
11/Crossing-the-line.-How-the-illegal-trade-with-occupied-
Donbas-undermines....pdf (accessed November 2018). 
63 Katherina Bosko, “Post-Minsk-Realität: Die Folgen der 
Donbas-Blockade durch ukrainische Rechtsradikale und der 
‘Nationalisierung’ von Unternehmen durch die ‘Volksrepu-
bliken’”, Ukraine-Analysen, no. 184 (10 May 2017): 2–6 (3). 
64 Interviews with business representatives in Kyiv, March 
2018. 
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Kyiv believes its conflict is not with the rulers in 
Donetsk and Luhansk, but with Russia. In that con-
text it is easy for the populations of the contested 
areas to be forgotten. This situation recalls the atti-
tude of other states in the region that have been 
affected by secession, especially Georgia in the 2000s. 
Petro Poroshenko approved the Minsk Agreements 
in September 2014 and February 2015 under great 
military pressure, but the documents remain highly 
contested in Ukraine; implementation – especially 
of the political provisions – has stalled. On the one 
hand, many Ukrainian actors assert that the security 
situation in the NGCAs is too volatile to permit elec-
tions to be held. On the other, they see a danger that 
special status for the two breakaway entities might 
grant Moscow a permanent veto over Ukrainian’s 
internal and foreign policies. 
In Kyiv there is broad consensus that the events 
in the Donbas are part of a hybrid war conducted by 
Russia against Ukraine.65 In this predominant inter-
pretation Moscow is waging war to block Ukraine’s 
Euro-Atlantic integration and restore its own hegemony 
over the entire country. From this perspective the 
conflict in the east is part of an existential struggle 
where only the Ukrainian or the Russian project can 
survive, but not both. 
 
65 The description of the Ukrainian Donbas discourse 
draws heavily on the findings of twenty-five interviews 
with political actors, experts and representatives of civil 
society organisations conducted by the author in Kyiv in 
March 2018, as well as participation in seminars and dia-
logue processes on the conflict since 2014. A very useful 
tabular overview of the positions of the parties represented 
in the Ukrainian parliament, the Verchovna Rada, is offered 
by a survey conducted by the weekly Zerkalo Nedeli: “Put’ 
domoj” [The way home], Zerkalo Nedeli, 13 June 2018. 
In this scheme the Donbas conflict is but one ele-
ment of that wider war. From the Ukrainian perspec-
tive there can be no separation between the events 
in the east and the annexation of Crimea: both are 
elements of one and the same Russian aggression, 
which also exhibits other characteristics of “hybrid 
warfare” such as political influence, cyber-attacks and 
economic pressure. From that perspective a resolution 
cannot be restricted to the Donbas, but instead pre-
supposes full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. In the eyes of most of my inter-
viewees reconciliation with Russia is neither likely 
nor possible. Accordingly, for the foreseeable future 
there can be no alternative to close political and mili-
tary ties with the West, in order to offer maximum 
resistance to Russia. 
Many interviewees also placed the Russian attack 
on Ukraine in a broader international context, de-
scribing it as one of several dimensions of Moscow’s 
war on the liberal global order and the Western com-
munity. They regard Ukraine as part of the West and 
a vanguard for defending its values. 
Kyiv’s Donbas narrative concentrates almost exclu-
sively on the geopolitical level and the relationship 
with Russia, with no space for a local conflict dimen-
sion. In this discourse the separatist rulers in Donetsk 
and Luhansk are not autonomous actors but puppets 
controlled by Moscow. Kyiv regards them as criminals 
and terrorists who must not be legitimised by treating 
them as a conflict party. 
The absence of a local dimension in Kyiv’s inter-
pretation of the conflict has grave consequences for 
the affected civilian population. In the eyes of most 
interviewees the war was inflicted on Ukraine entirely 
from outside in 2014, and lacked any – political 
or ethno-political – basis in Ukrainian society. Con-
sequently, there is no issue of reconciliation between 
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different ethnic or social groups, merely a need to 
establish or restore cohesion within one and the same 
society. Yet the emphasis on cohesion collides with 
Kyiv’s highly negative image of the Donbas, which 
is portrayed as backward, Soviet, unproductive and 
authoritarian.66 
Kyiv: no peace-building without full 
central control of separatist areas. 
This heavily geopolitical perspective also leads to a 
rigid categorisation of the populations of the conflict 
zones. A blanket suspicion is directed towards those 
who continue to live in the contested territories or 
alternate between the GCAs and the NGCAs. They 
find themselves liable to accusations of sharing anti-
Ukrainian attitudes and supporting the Moscow-led 
separatist forces.67 Under these conditions, peace-
building (which to the Ukrainians means the resto-
ration of social cohesion) is impossible until the sepa-
ratist areas have been liberated and returned to full 
central control. How the populations and the current 
rulers should be treated after the end of the conflict 
is a matter of great controversy. One of the foremost 
issues is a “draft law prohibiting collaboration” pro-
posed by the People’s Front party of Arseniy Yatsen-
yuk.68 Some Ukrainian interviewees said that they 
could not exclude the possibility of retribution against 
“collaborators” following a military victory for Kyiv.69 
 
66 See also Katharine Quinn-Judge, “To Reunite Ukraine, 
Kyiv Must Overcome Its Own Prejudices”, Crisis Group Com-
mentary (online) (20 March 2018). 
67 “The mainstream has no understanding for the people 
in the territories, that they are Ukrainians, that they must 
be helped. Responsibility for them is no concept for resolv-
ing this question, nor the social question.” Quote from an 
interview conducted by the author in Kyiv, March 2018. 
68 Proekt Zakonu pro zaboronu kolaboratsionizmu [Draft law 
prohibiting collaboration], Verchovna Rada Ukraini, 9 March 
2017, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511= 
61312 (accessed November 2018). See also Arsen Avakov, 
“Kollaboratsionizm i amnistija: Neobchodimost’ obshzhest-
vennogo dialoga” [Collaboration and amnesty: The necessity 
of societal dialogue], Ukrainskaja Pravda, 6 June 2018. 
69 See also ICG, Nobody Wants Us: The Alienated Civilians of 
Eastern Ukraine, Europe Report 252 (Kyiv and Brussels, 1 Octo-
ber 2018), 7ff. 
Controversy over the Minsk Agreements 
While the contextualisation of the Donbas war is 
uncontested in Kyiv, there are considerable differ-
ences within the Ukrainian political spectrum about 
how best to respond to the Russian aggression and 
how to treat the contested territories. Many actors 
regard the Minsk Agreements, and especially the 
February 2015 Package of Measures for implementing 
them, as a Russian imposition that the Ukrainian 
leadership was forced to accept in a moment of mili-
tary weakness. The political steps laid out in the 
Agreements – especially formalising special status in 
the Ukrainian constitution – are extremely contro-
versial. As a result, the Agreements are permanently 
questioned and challenged in the domestic political 
process. The heated atmosphere also prevents reforms 
such as decentralisation from playing a positive role 
in the peace process.70 Other issues such as language 
legislation further heighten tensions and are politi-
cally instrumentalised in the conflict. 
The implications of the March and April 2019 
presidential elections for the implementation of the 
Minsk Agreements and the future of the peace pro-
cess remain unclear. Poroshenko focused his election 
campaign on identity politics under the slogan 
“Army, Language, Faith” – with limited success, as 
his poor showing in the first round demonstrated. His 
surprise contender, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, remained 
vague on the Donbas and future relations with Russia 
for most of the election campaign. Shortly before the 
second round he declared his intention to continue 
to work for the implementation of the Minsk Agree-
ments, but said that the Minsk Process should be 
overhauled. He also called for direct talks with Russia 
since the war was between Ukraine and Russia. Most 
importantly, however, Ukraine should strive for an 
immediate ceasefire in the Donbas. Kyiv, Zelenskiy 
said, needed to take a more engaged and inclusive 
approach towards the communities affected by the 
conflict in the East, including by paying pensions to 
those entitled in the conflict region.71 
A number of hard right militias play an important 
role in the domestic debates over the Agreements and 
 
70 Roland Hackenberg, “Dezentralisierungsreform in 
der Ukraine”, Ukraine verstehen, 5 November 2018, https:// 
ukraineverstehen.de/dezentralisierungsreform-ukraine/ 
(accessed November 2018). 
71 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06neB6LZJyg 
(accessed April 2019). 
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the treatment of the contested areas.72 In line with 
the Minsk Agreements militias – including Azov, 
the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and 
Aidar – were formally integrated into the Ukrainian 
armed forces from the end of 2014, but some con-
tinue to exist as political organisations and are in 
certain cases close to Ukraine’s extreme right-wing 
scene. They played a significant role in all significant 
protests against Kyiv’s policies towards the Donbas, 
from legislative proposals in connection with the 
Minsk Package of Measures to the imposition of the 
economic embargo in 2017. Even if right-wing and 
extreme right-wing parties have failed to achieve any 
notable showing in elections since 2014, nationalist 
ideology enjoys considerable influence in the public 
debate over the conflict in the east (as it does in other 
issues). Nationalist actors have frequently succeeded 
in forcing the political leadership to modify policies. 
Implementation of the Minsk Agreements 
Since 2014 Kyiv has taken a series of steps to fulfil 
Ukrainian’s obligations under the Minsk Agree-
ments.73 In September 2014 the Ukrainian parlia-
ment, the Verchovna Rada, passed the amnesty law 
agreed in Minsk, although it has yet to come into 
force. The special status law followed in October 
2014, granting special self-administration rights to 
“particular areas in the regions of Donetsk and 
Luhansk”, initially for three years. The law codifies 
the right to use the Russian language in the affected 
areas and special status in the areas of administra-
tion, police/security forces, elections, and economic 
and cultural rights.74 In March 2015 Kyiv decreed that 
the special status law could not come into force until 
free and fair local elections had been held under 
 
72 On the history and importance of the militias see 
Huseyn Aliyev, “Bewaffnete Freiwilligenbataillone: In-
formelle Machthaber in der Ukraine”, Ukraine-Analysen, 
no. 205 (25 September 2018): 2ff. 
73 “Analyse: Faktencheck: Die Umsetzung der Minsker 
Vereinbarungen zum Donbass-Konflikt” (Bonn: Bundes-
zentrale für politische Bildung, 4 May 2015), http://www. 
bpb.de/205903/analyse-faktencheck-die-umsetzung-der-
minsker-vereinbarungen-zum-donbass-konflikt (accessed 
December 2018). 
74 For a documentation of the law, see “Gesetz über den 
Sonderstatus einzelner Bezirke der Region Donezk und 
Luhansk (16.09.2014)”, Ukraine-Analysen, no. 136 (17 Sep-
tember 2014): 9f. 
Ukrainian law in the contested territories.75 In sum-
mer 2015 President Poroshenko presented a proposal 
for anchoring the special status in the Ukrainian con-
stitution.76 The debate in the Verchovna Rada was 
accompanied by street protests in Kyiv, where violent 
clashes left several dead and dozens injured.77 The 
constitutional amendment has been on ice ever since. 
In October 2018, to the surprise of most observers, 
the special status law was extended without public 
disorder. The previous year’s extension had only been 
possible because the government presented it to par-
liament as part of a new law on the contested terri-
tories that for the first time explicitly named Russia 
as aggressor and occupying power. That law ended 
the Anti-Terror Operation and transferred responsibil-
ity for liberating and defending the occupied regions 
to the Ukrainian armed forces. It also expanded the 
president’s powers in the event of escalation.78 This 
legislative process was again accompanied by intense 
and in parts violent protests, in the course of which 
all reference to the Minsk Agreements disappeared 
from the draft law.79 Russia immediately criticised the 
law as a violation of Minsk.80 Once it had passed, the 
 
75 “Donbas Special Status Law Sparks Outrage, Protests”, 
Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, 6 October 2017, 
https://medium.com/dfrlab/donbas-special-status-law-sparks-
outrage-protests-21068354af5c (accessed November 2018). 
76 The de facto leaderships in Donetsk and Luhansk 
demanded participation in the constitutional debate. Kyiv 
rejected this on the grounds that they had come to power 
by means of terror and lacked electoral legitimation. Instead, 
Kyiv said, legitimate representatives from the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions would be included in the discussions. 
77 Nastya Stanko and Maksym Kamenev, “How Poroshenko 
Passed the Unpopular ‘Donbas Special Status Law’”, Hromadske, 
7 October 2017. 
78 “President Signed Law on Peculiarities of the State Policy 
on Ensuring the State Sovereignty of Ukraine in the Tempo-
rarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions“, 
President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko Official Website, 
20 February 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ 
prezident-pidpisav-zakon-pro-osoblivosti-derzhavnoyi-politik-
45950 (accessed November 2018). Generally known as the 
deoccupation or reintegration law in political and media 
contexts. 
79 “No Longer ATO, Not Yet War: Ukraine Adopts Con-
troversial ‘Donbas Reintegration’ Bill”, Euromaidan Press, 
18 January 2018. Interviews with deputies from the govern-
ing and opposition parties, Kyiv, March 2018. 
80 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
“Comment by the Information and Press Department on the 
Signing of the ‘Donbass Reintegration’ Law by the President 
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Ukrainian political leadership emphasised that it was 
adhering to the Agreements. Humanitarian organisa-
tions expressed concern that the law largely ignored 
the suffering in the conflict zone. 
 
of Ukraine”, 24 December 2018, http://www.mid.ru/ 
en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ 
content/id/3090905 (accessed November 2018). 
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Moscow plays a central political and military role 
in the Donbas conflict, while adhering to the Minsk 
Agreements. Unlike in the case of Crimea (which 
Russia annexed in a move that was not only revision-
ist but irredentist) or Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
(which it recognised in 2008) the Kremlin’s policy 
in the Donbas remains orientated on the status quo. 
Formally Moscow treats the contested territories as 
part of the Ukrainian state. 
At a press conference on 4 March 2014 Vladimir 
Putin laid out the official Russian interpretive frame-
work for Russian policy towards post-Maidan Ukraine, 
describing the events in Kyiv as “an anti-constitutional 
takeover, an armed seizure of power” and denying 
the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian government. 
Putin expressed his understanding for Ukrainians’ 
dissatisfaction with a system that had failed to im-
prove their lives since the country became independ-
ent. Corruption and inequality had, he said, been 
many times worse in Ukraine than in Russia. While 
the people had protested for understandable reasons, 
Putin said, other “forces” had exploited this to carry 
out a coup. Now, he said, “we see the rampage of 
reactionary forces, nationalist and anti-Semitic forces” 
in Kyiv and other parts of the country. “Therefore, 
if we see such uncontrolled crime spreading to the 
eastern regions of the country, and if the people ask 
us for help, … we retain the right to use all available 
means to protect those [Russian-speaking, S.F.] people. 
We believe this would be absolutely legitimate.”81 
This perspective has been maintained. While the 
situation in Kyiv has settled despite war and post-
2014 economic recession, Russia still regards Ukraine 
as a failing state. The Ukrainian election year has 
triggered the reemergence of the (misguided) belief 
 
81 Kremlin [official website], “Vladimir Putin Answered 
Journalists’ Questions on the Situation in Ukraine”, 4 March 
2014, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366 (accessed 
November 2018). 
that Russia-friendly or even pro-Russian forces could 
return to power in Kyiv. 
But Russia’s motivation was not merely to protect 
the Russian-speaking populations of Crimea and 
eastern Ukraine from a “fascist mob”. The Kremlin 
believed that the toppling of President Viktor Yanu-
kovych had been staged by Washington to bring 
Ukraine into NATO and further erode Russia’s in-
fluence in its own neighbourhood.82 From the Rus-
sian perspective the annexation of Crimea and 
support for the separatists in eastern Ukraine were 
merely acts of (self-)defence against the American 
drive towards a unipolar world order. As far as Mos-
cow was concerned, the West was instrumentalising 
ideas about “freedom” and “democracy” to justify 
interventions in the regional spheres of influence of 
other major powers (like Russia), and to interfere in 
the internal affairs of other states. In this sense Mos-
cow sees Ukraine as one of a long series of Western 
violations of international law, from the Kosovo con-
flict through the Iraq war to the intervention in 
Libya.83 
In that context the Russian-Ukrainian antagonism 
is no isolated phenomenon, but – seen from Mos-
cow – part of a much broader conflict conducted by 
the United States against Russia in Europe and glob-
ally.84 From the Russian perspective Ukraine is not an 
independent actor or adversary, but is controlled by 
Washington. This implies that possible solutions are 
located at the European and international levels, 
 
82 Kremlin [official website], “Address by the President of 
the Russian Federation”, 18 March 2014, http://en.kremlin. 
ru/events/president/news/20603 (accessed November 2018). 
83 On Russia’s legal argumentation see Christian Schaller, 
Völkerrechtliche Argumentationslinien in der russischen Außen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik: Russland, der Westen und das Nahe Ausland, 
SWP-Studie 10/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli-
tik, June 2018). 
84 The same basically applies to Russia’s engagement in 
the Middle East. 
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rather than in the scope of Russian-Ukrainian rela-
tions.85 And in the Russian narrative Crimea is ex-
cluded from the search for solutions. It is regarded 
as part of the Russian Federation, its annexation a 
chapter concluded.86 
Elements of Russia’s Donbas Policy 
Russian’s policy towards its neighbours draws on 
a revisionist toolbox, which it also employs in the 
unresolved conflicts in the region. In these Moscow’s 
actions are characterised by four elements that occur 
in different strengths and combinations,87 and can 
also be identified in the Donbas conflict. 
Military presence / intervention: Moscow continues to 
deny both the delivery of heavy weapons and other 
equipment to eastern Ukraine and the deployment 
of regular Russian forces there. In April 2015 Putin 
declared: “I tell you directly and definitely: There are 
no Russian troops in Ukraine.”88 Yet numerous inves-
tigative reports of both Western and Russian prov-
enance demonstrate in minute detail that Russian 
troops were deployed in summer 2014 near Ilovaisk 
and in February 2015 at Donetsk Airport and in 
Debaltseve. The methods upon which these studies 
are based include satellite imaging; geolocation using 
 
85 Russian interviewees repeatedly mentioned former 
President Medvedev’ call for a “new European security 
architecture”. 
86 See Kremlin [official website], “Meeting of the Valdai 
International Discussion Club” (with Vladimir Putin), 
18 October 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
news/58848 (accessed December 2018). 
87 Sabine Fischer, “Russian Policy in the Unresolved Con-
flicts”, in Not Frozen! The Unresolved Conflicts over Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Light of the Crisis 
over Ukraine, ed. Sabine Fischer, SWP Research Paper 9/2016, 
9–24 (12–24) (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
September 2016). 
88 Kremlin [official website], “Prjamaja Linija s Vladimirom 
Putinym” [Direct Line with Vladimir Putin], 16 April 2015, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49261 (accessed No-
vember 2018). In great contrast to the case of Russian inter-
vention in Crimea. In a documentary first broadcast on 
Russian state television in March 2015 Putin describes in 
minute detail the “necessities” and decision-making process 
that had led to the military operations in Crimea. In the pro-
cess he officially confirmed that Russian soldiers had been 
deployed there in March 2014. “Krym: Put’ na rodinu” [Cri-
mea: The way home], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t42-
71RpRgI (accessed November 2018). 
photographs of military equipment, other images 
and statements posted on social networks by Russian 
soldiers deployed in Ukraine; interviews with soldiers, 
eye-witnesses and relatives; and estimating the num-
bers of fallen Russian soldiers returned to Russia (pho-
tographs and coffin counts).89 Reliable information 
about the sections of the Ukrainian-Russian border 
not under Kyiv’s control is scarce. Despite its compre-
hensive mandate, the OSCE Mission has only restricted 
access there, but it has repeatedly reported truck con-
voys with undetermined cargo passing the border 
from Russia into Ukraine. It is suspected that these 
vehicles transport military equipment into the con-
tested areas.90 
 
89 See Igor Sutyagin, Russian Forces in Ukraine, RUSI Briefing 
Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
and Security Studies [RUSI], March 2015); Maksymilian Czu-
perski et al., “Versteckspiel vor den Augen aller: Putins Krieg 
in der Ukraine”, Atlantic Council, September 2015; Sean Case 
and Klement Anders, “Putin’s Undeclared War: Summer 
2014 Artillery Strikes against Ukraine”, Bellingcat, 2014. 
Bellingcat conducted particularly extensive research on the 
downing of the Malaysian passenger jet in July 2014. See 
numerous contributions on https://www.bellingcat.com and 
a comprehensive report: “MH17: The Open Source Investi-
gation Three Years Later”, Bellingcat, July 2017, https://www. 
bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/mh17-3rd-
anniversary-report.pdf (accessed November 2018). In Russia 
Novaya Gazeta led the reporting on Russian military opera-
tions in Ukraine. The opposition politician Boris Nemtsov 
worked with a group of experts to produce a report on the 
war in Donbas. It was later suspected that this could have 
been a reason for his assassination in February 2015 in Mos-
cow. The report was published posthumously: Putin: Voina, 
Nezavisimyj ekspertnyj doklad: Po materialam Borisa Nemtsova 
[Putin: War: Independent expert report based on materials 
from Boris Nemtsov] (Moscow, May 2015). 
90 Widely noted film footage taken by an SMM drone and 
published by the Mission in August 2018 shows two lorry 
convoys crossing the Russian/NGCA border in both direc-
tions, avoiding official crossings and travelling on dirt roads. 
The vehicles were not identified as carrying humanitarian 
aid. On the same day the Mission announced it had discov-
ered a makeshift military camp close to the Russian border 
in the Luhansk NGCA. OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Moni-
toring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 8 August 2018, https://www. 
osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/390179 
(accessed November 2018). 
Russia: Controlled Destabilisation by Revisionist Means 
SWP Berlin 
The Donbas Conflict 
April 2019 
24 
Russian actors involved in building 
quasi-state structures in 
contested areas. 
Support in establishing statehood: Russia does not 
recognise the People’s Republics and maintains no 
official contacts with their rulers. The Kremlin accord-
ingly avoided explicitly confirming the results of 
the November 2018 elections in the NGCAs. Russian 
actors are, however, involved in building quasi-state 
structures in the contested areas. Russia and the two 
entities are connected by a close network of “cura-
tors” operating as advisors in Moscow and in the gov-
ernment institutions of the People’s Republics, and 
as such forming a bridge between the two sides. The 
central figure in the curator system is Vladislav Sur-
kov, an advisor to the Russian President.91 He controls 
not only the contacts between the separatists and 
Moscow, but also the political processes in the con-
tested areas. As the Kremlin’s special representative 
he also plays an important role in the deliberations of 
the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk. Deputy Prime 
Minister Dmitry Kozak in turn heads the “Inter-minis-
terial Commission for the Provision of Humanitarian 
Aid for the Affected Areas in the Southeast of the 
Regions of Donetsk and Luhansk”, which is respon-
sible for humanitarian measures but also – accord-
ing to media reports – for (shadow) economic inter-
action with the contested areas.92 
It is frequently reported that the institutions in-
volved pursue diverging interests, as witnessed in the 
recurring power struggles in Donetsk and Luhansk. 
Observers suspect that the Russian security services 
back the hardliners and opponents of Minsk in both 
People’s Republics. Surkov’s mission, on the other 
hand, is to control precisely these actors and ensure 
that the Minsk Agreements survive. Economic inter-
ests also play a role in the relationships.93 Differences 
of position and interest in Moscow create a degree of 
political leeway for the actors in the People’s Repub-
 
91 See also ICG, Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine 
(see note 59), 12ff. 
92 “Novye starye kuratory: pochemu Moskva ne ostavit 
Donbass bez pomoshchi’ [The new old curators: Why 
Moscow is not abandoning Donbass], RBK, 15 June 2018. 
93 Nikolaus von Twickel, Annual Report on the Events in the 
“People’s Republics” of Eastern Ukraine 2017 (Berlin: Deutsch-
Russischer Austausch e.V. [DRA], 2018), http://www. 
austausch.org/files/DRA/Publikationen/Menschenrechts-
Monitoring/Annual_report_NGCAs_2017.pdf (accessed 
November 2018). 
lics, which they exploit for local power and distribu-
tion conflicts.94 
Naturalisation / pasportizatsiya: Moscow has been 
granting Russian citizenship to inhabitants of Ab-
khazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria since the 
2000s. This policy, known as pasportizatsiya, was 
originally also motivated by humanitarian concerns, 
to help residents of those regions escape their iso-
lation. But the naturalisation policy increasingly 
morphed into a means of exerting pressure on the 
respective rump states. It also encouraged the argu-
ment that Moscow was responsible for the fate of 
Russian citizens in these regions.95 
Russia naturalised the entire population of Crimea 
by the end of 2014. In the two People’s Republics, on 
the other hand, it has to date pursued policies predi-
cated on the status quo. While the Duma in February 
2014 passed a law easing naturalisation procedures 
for Russian-speaking residents of other states, it is not 
applied in the People’s Republics.96 In February 2017 
Putin decreed that “temporarily, during the political 
settlement period […] pursuant to the Minsk Agree-
ments”, identity documents, passports, training cer-
tificates, birth and marriage certificates and similar 
issued in the territories would be recognised in the 
Russian Federation. Residents of the contested areas 
would also be able to enter the Russian Federation 
without a visa.97 The Kremlin emphasised that the 
decree served humanitarian ends and complied with 
the Minsk Agreements. Indeed, the text cannot be 
construed as representing official recognition of the 
issuing institutions. Other parliamentary initiatives 
since 2014 aiming to ease naturalisation for residents 
 
94 ICG, Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine (see note 59), 
14. 
95 For greater detail see Fischer, “Russian Policy” 
(see note 87), 20ff. 
96 Paul Goble, “Moscow Cannot Afford a South Ossetian 
Strategy in Ukraine’s Donbas”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, 
no. 94 (18 July 2017). 
97 Ukaz o priznanii dokumentov [Executive Order on recognis-
ing documents], 18 February 2017, http://www.kremlin.ru/ 
acts/news/53895 (accessed November 2018). The Russian am-
bassador to the OSCE declared one month later that Russia 
would rescind recognition if Ukraine fulfilled its obligations 
under the Minsk Agreements. “MID Rossii rasskazal o voz-
mozhnoj otmene priznanija dokumentov DNR i LNR” [For-
eign ministry comments on possible cancellation of recog-
nition of documents from DPR and LPR], Novaya Gazeta, 
17 March 2017. 
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of the contested areas have had no success.98 Moscow 
has refrained from mass naturalisations of the kind 
practised in the past in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
and to a lesser extent also in Transnistria.99 
Economic support: Russia’s economic role is of exis-
tential importance for the contested areas in the 
Donbas. This has applied from the outset, especially 
to the smaller and economically weaker Luhansk 
People’s Republic. As well as supplying humanitarian 
aid, Russia also cushions the worst impacts of eco-
nomic isolation. Since Ukraine’s imposition of a trade 
embargo in 2017 both People’s Republics have be-
come completely dependent on Russia for supplies of 
raw materials and markets for their products. But the 
possibilities for commerce remain limited as long as 
Russia denies the entities official recognition.100 Fear 
of Western sanctions also leads Russian enterprises 
to exercise caution. In order to process payments 
“legally” they are channelled via South Ossetia, the 
only “partner country” that has to date officially 
recognised the People’s Republics.101 Russian curators 
also ensured that the rulers of Donetsk and Luhansk 
did not “nationalise” the affected Ukrainian enter-
prises in March 2017 but instead – in semantic 
accord with the Minsk Agreements – placed them 
 
98 “V Gosdume predlozhili uprostit’ poluchenije grazh-
danstva dlja DNR i LNR“ [Proposal easing naturalisation for 
DPR and LPR introduced in Duma], Novaya Gazeta, 25 April 
2017. 
99 This does not mean, of course, that nobody with Rus-
sian citizenship lives in the contested territories. Given that 
the Ukrainian constitution permits dual citizenship, it is 
likely that a meaningful number of Ukrainians probably 
received Russian passports during the period between the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the tightening of Russia’s 
naturalisation legislation at the end of the 1990s. Precise 
figures are not available, however. Thomas Hoffmann and 
Archil Chochia, “The Institution of Citizenship and Practices 
of Passportization in Russia’s European Neighbourhood 
Policies”, in Russia and the EU: Spaces of Interaction, ed. Thomas 
Hoffmann and Andrey Makarychev, 223–38 (232f.) (London 
and New York, 2019). 
100 Nikolaus von Twickel, “Analyse: Donbass: Sind die 
‘Volksrepubliken’ Marionettenstaaten?” (Bonn: Bundes-
zentrale für politische Bildung, 23 May 2018), http://www. 
bpb.de/internationales/europa/ukraine/269571/analyse-
donbass-sind-die-volksrepubliken-marionettenstaaten 
(accessed November 2018). 
101 For greater detail, see “Partner u nas odin – Rossijska-
ja Federacija” [We have only one partner – the Russian Fed-
eration], Kommersant Vlast’, 6 May 2017. 
“under external control”.102 Russia’s official humani-
tarian support and unofficial economic contacts en-
sure the survival of the power structures in the two 
contested areas, but their economic and socio-eco-
nomic situation remains precarious. To date Moscow 
has refrained from expanding its economic contacts 
with the People’s Republics and elevating them to a 
more official plane. 
Russia’s approach in this case exhibits similarities 
and differences to other conflicts. Its actions in Ukraine 
since 2014 have been considerably more planned 
and directed than in the civil wars that broke out in 
the course of the Soviet disintegration in the early 
1990s.103 In the Donbas Russian policy deliberately 
contributed to escalating the conflict. The specific 
combination of revisionist elements in the People’s 
Republics is most similar to the Russian approach to 
the conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 
years before the Russian-Georgian War of 2008. But 
this is not a static situation, and Moscow has been 
forced to repeatedly adjust its policy (for example by 
recognising documents). An incremental process with 
deeper Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine – 
comparable to the trajectory followed in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia over the years – cannot be 
excluded. 
 
102 Ibid. 
103 For a systematic comparison of the “old” unresolved 
conflicts see Sabine Fischer, “Conclusions and Recommen-
dations: European Peace Policy in the Unresolved Conflicts”, 
in Not Frozen!, ed. Fischer, 81–93 (87–93) (see note 87). 
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The humanitarian consequences of the war are 
deeply inscribed into Donbas society. They are a 
significant factor in the steadily widening gulf 
between Kyiv and the populations in the conflict 
regions, and especially in the NGCAs. 
What was once a temporary emergency in eastern 
Ukraine threatens to turn into a situation of per-
manent poverty and underdevelopment with all the 
associated negative consequences. Food security in 
the conflict region has deteriorated continuously, 
with the most drastic decline seen in the past three 
years. The proportion of the population in the 
People’s Republics without access to balanced nutri-
tion increased from 40 percent in 2016 to 86 percent 
in 2017. Even in the areas along the line of contact 
that are controlled by Kyiv the proportion is about 55 
percent.104 Humanitarian organisations point to a rise 
in the prevalence of typical symptoms of structural 
poverty such as drug abuse, alcoholism and prostitu-
tion, and to limited access to healthcare and school 
education. Populations of the more densely populated 
People’s Republics are especially severely affected. 
Here the suffering has increased in proportion to the 
growing isolation.105 
The Ukrainian government appears unable to cope 
with the humanitarian disaster. One reason for this is 
that the country’s weak state institutions were simply 
 
104 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs (UN OCHA), Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 
2018 (November 2017), 10, https://www. humanitarian 
response.info/en/operations/ukraine/document/ukraine-2018-
humanitarian-needs-overview-hno (accessed November 
2018). The dramatic rise is partly attributable to the eco-
nomic embargo imposed on the NCGAs in March 2017. 
105 United Nations in Ukraine, Humanitarian Response Plan 
Ukraine 2018 (4 December 2017), 21, http://www.un.org.ua/ 
en/resident-coordinator-system/humanitarian-response (ac-
cessed November 2018). 
overstretched, above all at the beginning of the war.106 
Another is the problematic role played by the ambiva-
lent stance of large parts of the political elites. More 
than a few politicians in Kyiv regard the Donbas as an 
unnecessary economic burden and its population as 
backward and politically untrustworthy. Their wil-
lingness to engage and to alleviate the humanitarian 
suffering in the conflict-affected areas is very lim-
ited.107 There is also a problem of representation. 
Since the Maidan revolution the Ukrainian party spec-
trum has focussed strongly on the centre and west of 
the country. The parties representing the east – the 
Opposition Bloc and the Communist Party – possess 
little influence at the national level. There is thus no 
significant political force capable of effectively rep-
resenting the region’s interests in Kyiv. In the Donbas 
this amplifies the feeling of being forgotten and ne-
glected.108 Structural asymmetries and political prior-
ities in Kyiv are also reflected at the level of govern-
ment. The “Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Terri-
tories and IDPs” established in 2016 is politically and 
financially weak and overshadowed by better-funded 
ministries. It is not perceived as a significant player 
by other state and non-state actors.109 
 
106 Veronique Barbelet, Humanitarian Access and Local Orga-
nisations in Ukraine, HPG Working Paper (London: Humanitar-
ian Policy Group [HPG], September 2017). 
107 ICG, Nobody Wants Us (see note 69), 4. 
108 Interviews with representatives of government and 
opposition parties in Kyiv, including members of the Ver-
chovna Rada; interviews in Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 
2018. 
109 Interview with representatives of the ministry, Kyiv, 
March 2018. Interviews with representatives of humanitarian 
organisations in Kyiv, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 
2018. See also ICG, Ukraine: The Line (see note 14), 2f.; ICG, 
Nobody Wants Us (see note 69), 7f. 
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Internally Displaced Persons and 
Pensioners 
According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Social Policy 
there were almost 1.5 million registered internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) living in Ukrainian-controlled 
territory in December 2017. The United Nations be-
lieves that a considerable proportion of IDPs registered 
in the GCAs live for at least part of the time in the 
NGCAs. The UN’s own estimates therefore put the 
number of IDPs living permanently in the GCAs at 
about 760,000.110 As well as the IDPs in Ukraine, 
another million people fled the war to Russia.111 Thus 
altogether the war in eastern Ukraine has displaced 
about two and a half million people temporarily or 
permanently from their homes. This exceeds the 
magnitude of flight and displacement during the 
Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Ukraine has the world’s 
tenth-largest population of IDPs.112 
The Donbas was a demographically old region even 
before the war on account of economically driven out-
ward migration. As a result the number of pensioners 
affected by the events is disproportionally high. About 
30 percent of the 3.4 million people requiring hu-
manitarian aid because of the conflict are of pension 
age – the highest proportion in any conflict world-
wide.113 
The Ukrainian public and local and regional ad-
ministrations responded with great solidarity and 
engagement to the plight of the refugees. Numerous 
aid convoys and generous donations reached the crisis 
area in 2014 and 2015. The support was organised 
quickly and unbureaucratically at grass-roots level. To 
 
110 Inna Volosevych and Tetiana Kostiuchenko, “Desk 
Research of the Survey of IDPs” (United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees [UNHCR]/GfK, December 2017), 
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/gfk_unhcr_ 
desk_report_final.pdf (accessed November 2018). Reliable 
information on the number of IDPs in the NGCAs is not 
available. 
111 In 2014 no country received more applications for 
asylum and refugee status than Russia About 90 percent of 
applications were approved that year. UNHCR, World At War: 
Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014 (Geneva, June 2015), 
https://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.pdf (accessed January 
2019). 
112 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017 
(Geneva, June 2018), http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/ 
(accessed November 2018). 
113 UN OCHA, Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018 
(see note 104), 8. 
this day tensions between local populations and the 
IDPs are rare. But the national political level remains 
ambivalent for the reasons laid out above. Initiatives 
to integrate IDPs are not supported by the whole gov-
ernment and are underfunded.114 
Internal displacement has become a 
chronic structural problem. 
The problem is especially clear in the case of IDPs 
of pension age. The Ukrainian government stopped 
paying social benefits to residents of the NGCAs in 
December 2014, in response to the holding of elec-
tions in contravention of the Minsk Agreements. 
Since 2014 pensioners living in the NGCAs have had 
to register as IDPs in the GCAs in order to receive 
their pensions. In 2016 checks were introduced to en-
sure that registered IDPs reside permanently at their 
place of registration. According to the UN close to 
500,000 of the almost 1.3 million pensioners registered 
in the NGCAs before the war were still regularly re-
ceiving their pensions.115 Kyiv’s policy – intended 
to prevent “pension tourism” between GCAs and 
NGCAs – denies a living to one of the groups most 
severely affected by the conflict. International organi-
sations see this as a human rights violation, as do cer-
tain Ukrainian state and non-state actors. They call for 
Kyiv to completely uncouple the pension payments 
from IDP status.116 A draft law to that effect prepared 
by the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories 
has been on ice in the Rada since summer 2017.117 
 
114 UNHCR, Multi-year, Multi-partner Protection and Solutions 
Strategy for Ukraine, 2018–2020 (Geneva, 8 January 2018), 2, 
http://www.unhcr.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/38/2018/ 
06/Ukraine-MYMP-Protection-and-Solutions-strategy-2018_ 
2022_FINAL.pdf (accessed November 2018). 
115 United Nations in Ukraine, Pensions for IDPs and Persons 
Living in the Areas Not Controlled by the Government in the East 
of Ukraine, UN Briefing Note (December 2017), http://www. 
humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse. 
info/files/documents/files/briefing_note_on_pensions_en.pdf 
(accessed November 2018). 
116 Interviews in Kyiv, March 2018. 
117 UN, Pensions for IDPs (see note 115). The Ukrainian 
constitutional court ruled in October 2018 that the existing 
practice was unconstitutional. But to date this has not led 
to the draft law being passed. UNHCR Legislative Update, 
October 2018, http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/ 
www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/2018_
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In the sixth year of the conflict internal displace-
ment is no longer a temporary phenomenon, but a 
chronic structural problem. IDPs face numerous prob-
lems, from securing a living to lack of political repre-
sentation. A survey by the International Organisation 
for Migration in March 2018 found for the first time 
a majority stating they no longer wished to return to 
their original homes.118 
Life in the “Grey Zone” and in the NGCAs 
The almost 500-kilometre line of contact between 
GCAs and NGCAs is a permanent source of humani-
tarian crisis. Five so-called Entry-Exit Crossing Points 
(EECPs) were established in 2015, four of them be-
tween GCA and Donetsk NGCA and just one on the 
shorter line between GCA and Luhansk NGCA. The 
latter crossing point, at Stanytsia Luhanska, is a 
deteriorating provisional wooden structure built over 
a heavily damaged concrete bridge and is only pass-
able on foot. The other crossing points (Maiorske, 
Marinka, Novotroitske and Hnutove) are also open for 
cars and lorries. To date the conflict parties have been 
unable to agree to open more crossings. The People’s 
Republics have little interest in encouraging traffic 
with the GCAs, fearing not least that more people 
could move permanently to the other side.119 In Kyiv 
efforts to more strongly isolate the NGCAs have been 
growing for years. Despite these restrictions the num-
ber of crossings has increased every year. For June 
2018 alone the UN reported no less than 1.2 million 
journeys across the line of contact.120 The existing 
infrastructure is hopelessly overstretched, leading to 
long waiting times exposed to shelling and harsh 
weather.121 The situation at the crossing points leads 
 
118 International Organisation for Migration, National 
Monitoring System Report on the Situation of Internally Displaced 
Persons (March 2018), 7, http://www.iom.org.ua/en/national-
monitoring-system-report-situation-internally-displaced-
persons-march-2018 (accessed November 2018). 
119 Eye-witnesses report restrictions on the mobility of 
particular professions such as doctors and teachers since 
2017. Interviews in Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 2018. 
120 UN OCHA, Ukraine: Checkpoints – Humanitarian Snapshot 
(16 July 2018), https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-
checkpoints-humanitarian-snapshot-16-july-2018 (accessed 
January 2019). 
121 UNHCR, Crossing the Line of Contact: Monitoring Report 
(February 2018), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/ 
sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ 
people to cross the line elsewhere, exposing them-
selves to the dangers of mines and unexploded ord-
nance.122 The zone along the line of contact is one 
of the world’s most heavily mined regions.123 
Since 2014 tens of thousands of residential build-
ings have been damaged or destroyed.124 Repairs and 
reconstruction have proceeded extraordinarily slowly 
and are impeded by ongoing fighting, especially in 
the NGCAs. Fighting and shelling also regularly dam-
age critical infrastructure and endanger the supply of 
electricity, water and heating on both sides of the line 
of contact. The Donetsk Filter Station (DFS), which 
supplies drinking water to 345,000 people on both 
sides of the line of contact, is especially exposed, and 
has been repeatedly shelled by both sides.125 Mainte-
nance staff of the operator Vodadonbasa regularly 
come under fire, frequently causing the water supply 
to be reduced or cut off altogether. 
About 200,000 people live in the immediate vicinity 
of the line of contact on the CGA side. Because the 
separatists deny access to the areas under their con-
trol, reliable population figures for their side are not 
available. On both sides, but especially in the NGCAs, 
troops operate from residential areas and civilian 
facilities and even locate heavy arms in them, with 
life-threatening consequences for the civilian popu-
lation.126 
 
report_eecp_february_2018_eng_1.pdf (accessed November 
2018). 
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123 The Halo Trust, Ukraine, http://www.halotrust.org/ 
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November 2018). 
124 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 
16 February 2018 – 15 May 2018, (20 June 2018), 9, https:// 
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125 OHCHR, Statement on the Humanitarian Impact of Contin-
ued Shelling Near the Donetsk Filter Station (14 May 2018), 
reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/un-resident-coordinator-and-
humanitarian-coordinator-ukraine-neal-walker-statement-0 
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Ukraine, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission Thematic Report 
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Access to Humanitarian Aid 
In the GCAs: Before the war Ukraine had little experi-
ence with humanitarian crises. International humani-
tarian organisations encountered numerous bureau-
cratic, logistical and legal hindrances when they 
began operating there in the course of 2014.127 But 
Kyiv worked to remove the obstacles. Ukrainian and 
international organisations praise the cooperation of 
state institutions – including the Civilian-Military 
Administrations in the Donetsk and Luhansk NCGAs, 
but note that problems still persist.128 For example a 
draft law on humanitarian aid in crises, which would 
clarify important taxation issues and clear bureau-
cratic obstacles, has been stuck in the Rada since 
2015. The fact that the law has still not come into 
force hampers the work of humanitarian organisa-
tions.129 
Red Cross is the only international 
organisation operating in both 
People’s Republics. 
In the NGCAs: Access for humanitarian organisations 
to the NGCAs has deteriorated continuously since 2014. 
They must be accredited by the local regime and are 
subject to strict monitoring and control.130 Only the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is 
able to operate in both People’s Republics. A few 
other organisations have been granted access in the 
interim, but find their work permanently hampered 
by the caprices of the de facto authorities. Observers 
suspect that non-state organisations in particular are 
perceived as pro-Western and thus hostile, while the 
ICRC appears more neutral on account of Russia’s 
 
127 Barbelet, Humanitarian Access (see note 106). 
128 Interviews in Kyiv, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 
2018. Some interviewees complained for example that while 
the Civilian-Military Administrations organised regular 
meetings with humanitarian organisations, they failed to 
follow through on commitments concerning implementa-
tion. 
129 UN OCHA, Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018 (see 
note 104), 11. 
130 Humanitarian organisations attribute this to “espio-
nage paranoia” on the part of those in effective control, and 
to their wish to prevent direct contact between international 
humanitarian organisations and the populations of the terri-
tories. Interviews in Kyiv, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 
2018. 
membership.131 Most humanitarian work in the 
NGCAs is done by local networks operating under 
difficult political conditions. These often avoid con-
flicts with local rulers by operating below the thresh-
old of formal organisation.132 The growing isolation 
of the People’s Republics severely restricts their access 
to humanitarian goods and services. For example, 
when Rinat Akhmetov’s businesses were expropriated 
in spring 2017 the charity he ran was also forced out 
of Donetsk. Until then it had played a central role in 
supplying the population with humanitarian aid.133 
Under these conditions Russia’s role as a provider 
of humanitarian aid for the NGCAs has grown.134 
Since summer 2014 the Russian Ministry of Emergency 
Situations reports having sent dozens of convoys with 
more than 77,000 tonnes of humanitarian aid into 
the contested territories.135 The Ukrainians and inter-
national observers suspect that these convoys bring 
military as well as humanitarian support across the 
border, but the charge cannot be verified because 
Russia refuses to permit systematic cargo inspections. 
The Russian public participates with donations and 
voluntary engagement. The distinction between hu-
manitarian aid and political support for the separat-
ists is fluid. Russia also took in almost one million 
war refugees from Ukraine in 2014 and 2015, a figure 
without precedent in Russian history.136 
International donors and humanitarian organisa-
tions have noticeably scaled back their activities in 
 
131 Barbelet, Humanitarian Access (see note 106), 6f. 
132 Ibid., 16. 
133 Interviews in Kyiv, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, March 
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2017 [2017 report of the humanitarian staff of Rinat Akh-
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eration, “Dostavka gumanitarnoj pomoshchi dlja otdelnyh 
rajonov Doneckoj i Luganskoj oblastej Ukrainy” [Deliveries 
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Ukraine since 2016.137 In early 2018 the United 
Nations noted that it had funds to cover only 45 per-
cent of the humanitarian aid needed in the eastern 
Ukrainian war zone in 2017.138 Interviewees gave 
several reasons for this. In the “competition of inter-
national crises” the humanitarian emergency in 
Ukraine has dropped down the international agenda 
since the advent of the European migration crisis, 
while the priorities of the biggest Western donors 
have shifted to the Middle East and North Africa. 
Another factor is that restricted access, political des-
potism and the almost complete absence of transpar-
ency deter international donors from releasing larger 
sums for the Ukrainian NGCAs. Finally the ongoing 
instability in the conflict area restricts the room for 
manoeuvre open to humanitarian organisations, as 
does Kyiv’s prioritisation of security over access to 
humanitarian aid.139 In view of dwindling external 
engagement, representatives of international organi-
sations speak of a forgotten humanitarian disaster in 
eastern Ukraine. 
 
137 The European Union and its member states have con-
tributed more than €677 million for humanitarian aid and 
reconstruction since 2014, putting them among the largest 
humanitarian donors. European Civil Protection and Hu-
manitarian Aid Operations, Factsheet Ukraine (21 June 2018), 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/europe/ukraine_en (accessed 
November 2018). 
138 Interview with UN OCHA Kramatorsk, March 2018. 
139 Interviews with representatives of state and non-state 
humanitarian organisations in Kyiv, Kramatorsk and Slo-
viansk, March 2018. UN OCHA, Ukraine Humanitarian Needs 
Overview 2018 (see note 104), 11. 
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Efforts to end the fighting in the Donbas have been 
stalled since autumn 2016, with the conflict parties 
showing no willingness to compromise. Ongoing 
ceasefire violations spread fear and reflect the general 
absence of trust. At the same time all sides profit in 
one way or another from the current stalemate. This 
applies most strongly to the two People’s Republics, 
which would cease to exist if the Minsk Agreements 
were implemented. Internal political instability in 
Ukraine suits Russia, and Kyiv can postpone imple-
mentation of what it sees as the disadvantageous po-
litical provisions of Minsk. In the meantime impedi-
ments to peace consolidate on all levels and a per-
manent solution becomes more unlikely by the day. 
Kyiv and the People’s Republics are growing ever fur-
ther apart. By creating quasi-state institutions and 
holding elections in 2014 and 2018 the separatists 
and their Russian supporters have created facts on the 
ground that mitigate against reaching an understand-
ing with the Ukrainian leadership. Kyiv’s imposition 
of an economic embargo in March 2017 further deep-
ened the isolation of the populations of the NGCAs. 
The Ukrainian political elite’s fixation on the geo-
political conflict with Russia is understandable, but 
blinds Kyiv to the political and humanitarian situa-
tion in the region. This contrasts with the reality 
along the line of contact, which still sees about one 
million crossings monthly. The population in the 
Donbas is squeezed between the opposing parties. 
Even humanitarian aid is divided along political lines. 
International humanitarian organisations (not to 
speak of Ukrainian) are largely excluded from the 
NGCAs and can therefore operate only in the Ukrain-
ian-controlled areas. In the NGCAs humanitarian aid 
from Russia has grown in importance. While the war 
in the Donbas did not originate in an ethno-political 
conflict, it does drive the affected communities apart 
at the local level and heightens the existing distance 
and mistrust between Kyiv and the populations of the 
NGCAs. In the longer term this will impede the res-
toration of social peace. 
The dependency of the two People’s Republics on Russia 
has grown steadily since 2014, in a development 
exponentially accelerated by the economic isolation 
imposed by Kyiv since 2017. Disagreements between 
Moscow’s curators sometimes open up a degree of 
independent space for local actors, but it must be 
assumed that Russia exercises far-reaching control 
over the de facto authorities and military and politi-
cal developments. Informality and lack of transparen-
cy in these relationships and Moscow’s refusal to 
acknowledge its own role in the conflict undermine 
the trust of the other actors and thus hamper all 
efforts to promote peace. 
Relations between Ukraine and Russia have witnessed 
an unprecedented alienation since 2014, with the 
Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea and the out-
break of war in the Donbas. Numerous bilateral 
political and economic agreements have been ter-
minated and economic ties severed: Russia suspended 
the CIS Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine in early 
2016 citing incompatibility with Ukraine’s DCFTA 
with the European Union. Ukraine has largely ended 
its dependency on Russian energy imports, and both 
sides have imposed extensive sanctions against the 
other.140 Today there is neither local border traffic nor 
direct flights between the two. Diplomatic relations 
have heavily scaled back, although not broken off 
entirely. Kyiv decided at the end of 2018 not to extend 
the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty, upon which 
relations between the two states have rested since 
 
140 See Alexander Libman, Russland, Ukraine und Türkei im 
Geflecht der Sanktionen: Warum Moskaus und Kiews neue Straf-
maßnahmen auch für die EU ein Problem sind, SWP-Aktuell 
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1991.141 The treaty expired in March 2019. Perhaps 
the most symbolic break is the autocephaly of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church carried through by 
President Poroshenko.142 
Solutions discussed in Kyiv and 
Moscow are mutually exclusive. 
The Ukrainian public and political elites over-
whelmingly regard Russia as aggressor and enemy, 
while the Russian mainstream sees Ukraine as a 
vassal of the United States. There is virtually no com-
mon ground between the conflict narratives – nor 
on any other issue. The solutions aired in Kyiv and 
Moscow are mutually exclusive. Ukraine demands the 
restoration of its territorial integrity and sovereignty 
over the contested Donbas entities and Crimea. Mos-
cow neatly separates the two issues and makes a reso-
lution of the Donbas conflict contingent upon agree-
ment with the Western powers on a reorganisation 
of European and international security. The internal 
political trends on both sides offer no prospect of 
change in the foreseeable future. In this dimension 
too, the scope for understanding has shrunk to a 
minimum. 
The relationship between Russia and the conflict-relevant 
Western actors Germany, France, European Union, NATO 
and the United States has deteriorated continuously 
since 2014. The rift over the annexation of Crimea 
and the war in eastern Ukraine led to reciprocal sanc-
tions and a deep crisis in political relations. Numer-
ous additional points of contention have emerged 
since: growing security tensions in Europe; Russian 
support for Euro-sceptic and anti-European forces in 
EU member states and active intervention in elec-
tions; Russian intelligence activities with lethal con-
sequences in the case of the Skripals. Mutual trust is 
practically non-existent. Russian hopes of improving 
relations with Washington under President Trump 
have been dashed. Instead Russian-American rela-
tions have hit their lowest point since the end of 
the Cold War. Washington’s response to Russian 
interference in the US presidential election, has 
detached US sanctions policy from the European 
Union and from its original purpose – the situation 
 
141 “Rada Votes to Scrap Ukrainian-Russian Friendship 
Agreement”, Kyiv Post, 6 December 2018. 
142 Regina Elsner, Unabhängige Kirche in der Ukraine: Friedens-
garant oder Kriegstreiber? ZOiS Spotlight 31/2018 (Berlin: ZOiS, 
19 September 2018). 
in Ukraine – and made it increasingly unpredictable. 
Consequently the international level offers no pros-
pect of positive developments in the peace process 
either. 
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Russia has forced Ukraine into two territorial con-
flicts, by annexing Crimea in 2014 and fanning ten-
sions in eastern Ukraine into war. Fighting continues 
in the Donbas. And as the November 2018 escalation 
in the Kerch Strait demonstrated, the two conflicts – 
despite Moscow’s insistence to the contrary – are 
closely connected. Ukraine is undeniably militarily 
weaker than Russia. At the same time the political 
leadership in Kyiv has been facing intense domestic 
pushback for their policies, including the support 
for the Minsk Agreements. The implications of the 
2019 presidential and parliamentary elections are 
uncertain, and with them Kyiv’s future approach to 
the conflict in the Donbas. The People’s Republics 
of Donetsk and Luhansk currently lack some of the 
defining characteristics of other de facto states in the 
regions. They are Russian creations controlled by 
Moscow. 
The European Union has established a division of 
labour concerning the territorial conflicts in Ukraine. 
The EU explicitly supports Ukraine’s territorial integ-
rity and sovereignty and condemns Moscow’s annexa-
tion of Crimea and its role in the Donbas. The EU 
successively imposed sanctions on Russia from March 
2014. In March 2015 the European Council decided 
not to lift its sanctions until the Minsk Agreements 
have been implemented in full.143 
The European Commission and the European Ex-
ternal Action Service are working with the Ukrainian 
government to implement the Association Agreement 
and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agree-
ment (DCFTA) between the European Union and 
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Ukraine. In this context Brussels is supporting large-
scale political and economic reform processes, in the 
course of which Ukraine will adopt large parts of EU 
community law. Reform programmes such as decen-
tralisation also hold potential relevance for conflict 
resolution. From the European Union’s perspective 
Europeanisation – in the sense of promoting democ-
racy and (market) economic development, strengthen-
ing human and minority rights, and anchoring the 
principles of division of powers and peaceful conflict 
regulation – can supply an important contribution 
to societal reconciliation and conflict resolution.144 
Since 2014 the European Union has also significantly 
increased its financial support for Ukraine and is one 
of the largest funders of humanitarian aid and peace-
building measures. 
Unlike the cases of Transnistria, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, the European institutions have no im-
mediate role in conflict management. That part fell in 
2014 to Germany and France, which have since then 
conducted the most important international peace 
process for the Donbas, the talks in the Normandy 
Format. The European Union’s sanctions policy and 
German and French mediation made an important 
contribution to containing the fighting in 2014/2015 
and driving up the price of further escalation. But 
they were not able to resolve the conflict. 
There is currently no alternative to the outlined 
division of labour between the EU level and the in-
volved member states. Both the situation in the con-
flict region and the international context are excep-
tionally fragile. If existing communication channels 
are lost the repercussions for the conflict dynamic 
could be very negative. Any change to the format 
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risks the strongly alienated conflict parties completely 
rejecting any agreement. Moreover the EU member 
states are today far less united on what an appropri-
ate policy towards Russia and the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict should look like than they were in 2014 and 
2015. Berlin and Paris bear a great responsibility here. 
They need to keep Ukraine on the political agenda, 
preserve the consensus on sanctions, and further 
develop their policy on the conflict in close coordina-
tion with their European partners. The European 
embedding of their actions should be made clear to 
Moscow, which traditionally focuses on bilateral rela-
tions with the most important EU states and actively 
seeks to exploit differences between member states 
in order to divide the Union. 
Nord Stream 2: Berlin must take 
account of Ukrainian interests. 
The Nord Stream 2 pipeline needs to be discussed 
in this context. Berlin was much too late in admitting 
the scale of the geopolitical impact of the German-
Russian project for eastern Europe, above all for 
Ukraine. If Nord Stream 2 is to be pursued the Ger-
man government must take account of Ukrainian 
interests, for example concerning gas transit, and 
exert pressure on Moscow where these interests are 
endangered, for example by reducing the envisaged 
gas volumes to be supplied. Both Germany and France 
are currently absorbed by domestic and intra-EU 
problems and crises. Leaders in Berlin and Paris must 
nevertheless restore the foreign policy priority granted 
to the situation in Ukraine to the level warranted by 
its overall significance for Europe’s security. 
The Minsk Agreements have often been called into 
question by critics arguing that they disadvantage 
Ukraine and have failed to bring about an end to the 
conflict. But all relevant actors should remember 
how unlikely it is that a new agreement could be 
reached – still less a better one – and how danger-
ous it would be if there were none at all. The biggest 
problem today is that the conditions for implement-
ing the Agreements are worsening rather than im-
proving. The same applies to the deployment of a 
UN-mandated peacekeeping force, which would, at 
the same time, be a big step in the right direction. 
The Kerch escalation has further accelerated the 
negative trend. Since November 2018, the parties to 
the conflict have blocked all efforts to investigate. 
Germany, France and the European Union must con-
tinue to work to clarify the events, secure the release 
of the detained crews, and avoid further escalations 
in the Sea of Azov. They must continue to demand 
that Moscow resume direct contacts between the 
Ukrainian and Russian armed forces, including in the 
JCCC framework. Russia’s actions in the Kerch Strait 
are based on claims stemming from the annexation 
of Crimea, which are thus not internationally recog-
nised. Even if Ukraine must be reminded to avoid 
escalation risks, the main responsibility lies with Mos-
cow. The European Union should, therefore, consider 
imposing additional sanctions if necessary.145 
At the level of Ukrainian-Russian relations the 
need is to counsel moderation on both sides. This is 
easier in relation to Ukraine, but a difficult challenge 
nonetheless. Certain points need to be put to Kyiv 
much more assertively than hitherto. The security 
provisions of the Minsk Agreements must be observed 
by all parties. This applies not only to Russia and the 
rulers in the People’s Republics, but also to Ukraine, 
which must finally withdraw from Stanytsia Luhanska 
in accord with the disengagement of forces agreement 
of 2016. Germany and its European partners should 
make it clear to Kyiv that its ongoing obstruction of 
the ceasefire can have negative consequences for co-
operation. Kyiv’s current policy towards the Donbas 
contributes to deepening the conflict by aggravating 
the humanitarian situation. Germany and the Euro-
pean Union should nudge the Ukrainian leadership 
towards a more nuanced perspective on the conflict; 
one that looks beyond the geopolitical fixation on 
Russia and encompasses the local level. The Ukraini-
an state is responsible for its citizens on both sides of 
the line of contact. Kyiv also bears undeniable respon-
sibility for economic reconstruction of the areas 
under its control. Germany and the European Union 
must continue to press for concrete steps in that 
direction and consider generously supporting them. 
The European Union’s relationship with Russia 
is currently in tatters, possibilities for influence rare. 
The sanctions need to be maintained. At the same 
time European actors should continue to clearly dis-
tance themselves from Washington’s erratic sanctions 
policies. European and Russian ideas about a future 
European security order are too far apart for any 
timely convergence to be conceivable. Nevertheless 
dialogue must continue, even if detached from the 
Donbas conflict and without expectations of rapid 
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successes. Calls to end sanctions – as heard immedi-
ately after Putin’s proposal of a UN mission – are 
unrealistic and destabilising. Security with Russia 
remains an important policy objective for Germany 
and Europe. But currently the positions diverge too 
strongly for a solution to the Donbas conflict to be 
sought from this level. 
In view of the blockages in the inter-governmental 
and international dimensions, special attention must 
be directed to the local level. The humanitarian suf-
fering on both sides of the line of contact must be 
alleviated as a matter of urgency. Humanitarian aid 
and economic reconstruction are required, along with 
an end to the socio-economic isolation experienced by 
the populations of the NGCAs. Germany and Europe 
must press Kyiv to lift its economic embargo. Berlin, 
Paris and Brussels must also raise the humanitarian 
disaster there in their dialogue with Russia. Only Mos-
cow can persuade the rulers in Donetsk and Luhansk 
to grant greater access to humanitarian organisations. 
Both sides should be urged to approve additional 
crossing points on the line of contact to ease move-
ment between the GCAs and NGCAs. Such measures 
aim to slow or reverse the drifting apart of the af-
fected populations. Kyiv needs to understand that 
contact is an opportunity and not a threat. The TCG 
and the SMM must continue to work on confidence-
building measures along the line of contact. That 
could for example include restoring railway links for 
civilian passenger transport, medical staff cooperating 
across the line of contact, or better protection for 
maintenance work at water filter stations. This would 
bring benefits for people on both sides and contribute 
to restoring trust. Such an approach would imply a 
certain degree of engagement with functional elites 
in the People’s Republics, which is only possible in 
close dialogue with the Ukrainian side. Germany in 
particular must use its political weight and its role in 
the peace process to reassure Kyiv that this does not 
mean a creeping recognition of the two entities. Steps 
at the local level have very limited reach, but are vital 
to creating a basis for more ambitious peace solutions. 
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